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Abstract
Substantive due process is one of the most cherished and elusive doctrines in
American constitutional jurisprudence. The understanding that the Constitution of the
United States protects not only specifically enumerated rights, but also broad concepts
such as “liberty,” “property,” and “privacy,” forms the foundation for some of the
Supreme Court’s most impactful—and controversial—decisions.
This thesis explores the constitutional merits and politicizing history of natural
rights jurisprudence from its application in Dred Scott v. Sandford to its recent evocation
in Obergefell v. Hodges. Indeed, from slavery to same-same sex marriage, substantive
due process has played a pivotal role in shaping our nation’s laws and destiny: But was it
ever intended to?
This paper first examines the legal arguments in favor of substantive due process
to determine whether the judiciary was designed to be the “bulwark” of natural as well as
clearly scribed law. Then, employing a novel framework to measuring judicial
politicization, the thesis tracks the doctrine’s application throughout its most prominent
case studies. Often arriving at nuanced conclusions, we observe that the truth is more
often painted in some gradation of grey than in black or white.
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Section One: Introduction
Initial Remarks
The notion that the Supreme Court—and the judiciary generally—is (or should be)
apolitical is grounded in the institution’s historical origins and has long been widely
viewed as critical to its legitimacy. In Federalist No. 78, Alexander Hamilton made the
duty of the federal court system clear:
The interpretation of the laws is the proper and peculiar province of the courts. A
constitution is, in fact, and must be regarded by the judges, as a fundamental
law. It therefore belongs to them to ascertain its meaning, as well as the
meaning of any particular act proceeding from the legislative body. If there
should happen to be an irreconcilable variance between the two, that which has
the superior obligation and validity ought, of course, to be preferred; or, in other
words, the Constitution ought to be preferred to the statute, the intention of the
people to the intention of their agents. 1
Furthermore, Hamilton wrote that courts “are to be considered as the bulwarks of a
limited Constitution against legislative encroachments” and that the “independent spirit”
of judges is “essential to the faithful performance of so arduous a duty.” 2 Due to justices’
manner of appointment and confirmation, lifetime tenure, and other factors, the judiciary
is deliberately designed to be insulated from the swings of public opinion, whims of the
masses, and pressure of legislators.
It is important for the Supreme Court to be viewed as politically agnostic in large
part because of its power of judicial review: Since it is the Supreme Court that has the
power to define the scope of legislative and executive power under the Constitution, it is

1

Alexander Hamilton, "The Federalist Papers: No. 78," The Avalon Project: Federalist No 78, Accessed
January 19, 2018, http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/fed78.asp.
2
Ibid.
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critical that the Court be perceived as a neutral arbiter. An ultimate tribunal that is closely
tied to a political party or cause is an umpire drawn from the ranks of the home team—
little time is likely to elapse before the boo’s start, the game erupts in chaos, and the final
score is dismissed as illegitimate.
As a deliberately unrepresentative body, the Supreme Court’s legitimacy, unlike
that of Congress and the executive branch, does not depend on success at the ballot box.
Insofar as the American form of government rests upon the principle that ultimate power
is to be earned through democratic processes, the Supreme Court has no clear and
credible purpose other than as an ostensibly impartial arbiter of the law. For this reason,
politicization of the Supreme Court has long been decried as antithetical to its role within
our governmental scheme.
History, too, provides strong support to the notion that excessive association with
a political or partisan cause has the potential to undermine the legitimacy of the Court. A
string of judicial decisions striking down parts of the New Deal did, in fact, precipitate
President Franklin Roosevelt’s “court-packing” plan,3 which, if implemented, had the
potential to seriously undermine the independence of the Court. President Roosevelt’s
arguments in favor of the plan suggest the inherent dangers for the Court when it blurs
the lines (or is perceived to blur the lines) between judicial interpretation and public
policy making. In defending the court-packing plan, Roosevelt stated:
The Courts, however, have cast doubts on the ability of the elected Congress to
protect us against catastrophe by meeting squarely our modern social and
economic conditions. . . . The Court has been acting not as a judicial body, but as
a policy-making body. . . . We have, therefore, reached the point as a nation
3

The History Channel, "Roosevelt Announces "court-packing" Plan," History.com,
https://www.history.com/this-day-in-history/roosevelt-announces-court-packing-plan.
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where we must take action to save the Constitution from the Court and the Court
from itself. We must find a way to take an appeal from the Supreme Court to the
Constitution itself.4
Roosevelt’s assertion that he, alongside Congress, needed to “save the Court from itself”
lost favor with the American public and, luckily, his plan was never implemented.
However, hindsight affords us the opportunity to clearly see the slippery slope such a
road could have paved.
Politicization of the Supreme Court not only undermines its institutional
legitimacy—it also often accords the Court a public policymaking role that it is uniquely
unsuited to perform. Courts have no easily accessible mechanism for tapping wideranging outside expertise, incorporating the diverse spectrum of views held by the
American public, or regularly “tweaking” policy in order to address the multitude of
minute dilemmas that might arise following implementation. Furthermore, members of
the Court are appointed for life, and its composition is refreshed with “young blood” only
periodically (although, to be fair, Congressional seats cannot be said to have high
turnover, either). The judicial review process is time-consuming, shielded from public
opinion (at least in theory), and highly bureaucratic. As such, courts are well-suited for
the independent adjudication of particular laws or disputes and especially poor at crafting
public policy.
While the Constitution ultimately rejects a model that provides the Supreme Court
a political role, even the most cursory analysis suggests that the institution—from its

4

Franklin Delano Roosevelt, "Fireside Chat on Reorganization of the Judiciary," FDR: Fireside Chat on
Judicial Reorganization, Accessed January 19, 2018,
http://xroads.virginia.edu/~ma02/volpe/newdeal/court_fireside_text.html.
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earliest incarnation through to its most recent rulings—has both helped form and been
shaped by the partisan politics of its times. Indeed, political controversy surrounding our
nation’s highest court is no modern phenomenon. This is perhaps most easily illustrated
by considering one of the earliest and most important Supreme Court decisions: Marbury
vs. Madison (1803).
Marbury, most famous for establishing the principle of judicial review, also
illustrates the abiding power of politics to insert itself into judicial decision-making. The
case arose from a “court packing” exercise not dissimilar in its objective (albeit on a
much smaller scale) from that contemplated by President Roosevelt. The Judiciary Act of
1801 created a substantial number of new judgeships that President Adams proceeded to
fill with Federalists in an effort to preserve his party’s control of the judiciary. 5 William
Marbury, among the last to be appointed, did not receive his commission before the
opposition party, led by Thomas Jefferson, took over the Presidency. 6 When the new
Secretary of State, James Madison, refused to honor the appointment at the direction of
the newly elected Anti-Federalist President, Marbury requested the Court to issue a writ
of mandamus to force the new administration to deliver his commission. 7 In 1803 as well
as today, Americans have always been willing to put up a vigorous fight when it comes to
their paychecks.
Indeed, from Marbury on, the Supreme Court has rightfully ruled on hundreds of
fundamental questions that strike to the very heart of the nation’s most pressing public
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History.com staff, "Marbury v. Madison," History.com, Published in 2009 and accessed November 20,
2017, https://www.history.com/topics/marbury-v-madison.
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policy debates. This is the heavy duty and responsibility of the federal judiciary. That
Supreme Court decisions have political repercussions is inevitable: The very power of
judicial review presupposes judicial intervention in—and, as necessary, over-ruling of—
political decisions. The Court has rightfully played a pivotal role in a wide range of the
country’s most important and controversial policy issues including (but not limited to)
slavery, desegregation, the death penalty, affirmative action, pornography, gun rights, and
voting rights. It has done so in the course of interpreting a multitude of constitutional
provisions, including those related to its own jurisdiction (as in Marbury vs. Madison),
the Commerce Clause (as in any number of decisions invalidating various New Deal
programs), and each of the amendments in the Bill of Rights. However, because there is
little textual or historical basis for the concept of substantive due process, the doctrine
occupies a special place in the politicization of the Supreme Court.
Thus, this paper explores the role of substantive due process in the politicization
of the Supreme Court throughout American constitutional history. The first job in so
ambitious an exercise is to define what is meant by politicization, explore its nature, and
provide some criteria by which its prominence in an institution such as the Supreme
Court (and the judiciary more generally) can be measured. This, alongside application of
the developed methodology to the present day, is the focus of Section One of this thesis.
The second critical task is to explore the origins and constitutional merits of
substantive due process as well as its relationship to more general approaches to legal
interpretation (Section Two). In addition, I shall also trace the history of the doctrine’s
application through the decisions of the Court (Section Three), especially as those
decisions are, or were perceived to be, fundamentally political.

6

Finally, after providing a holistic view of substantive due process in American
jurisprudence, Section Four will return us to the present day. In doing so, it expounds
how the currently politicized state of the Supreme Court (especially with respect to the
doctrine) may be addressed moving forward. First, however, it is worth examining how to
measure judicial polarization and apply that metric to the contemporary landscape of the
federal judiciary generally and the Supreme Court in particular.

Politicization of the Supreme Court: A 2018 Status Check
Defining what, precisely, is meant by the “politicization” of the Supreme Court is
a more difficult task than it might initially seem. At first glance, one is tempted to employ
an approach similar to that of Justice Potter Stewart’s test for recognizing obscenity in the
Supreme Court’s 1964 case, Jacobellis v. Ohio: “I know it when I see it.”8
Unfortunately, a bit more specificity is needed for the purposes of this paper.
While more formal statistical modes of measurement will be addressed, the working
definition used in this thesis assesses the degree of politicization of the Supreme Court
using five interrelated factors:
● The degree to which the Court makes controversial decisions that are important to
the public and inconsistent with the strongly held views of a not insubstantial
sector of the public, based on a rationale that is obscure.
● The extent to which the Supreme Court deviates (or appears to deviate) from
established precedent or modes of judicial interpretation to reach a particular
result in cases that have broad political implications.
● The extent to which Supreme Court composition is the focus of political
processes, including election rhetoric and voting priorities.
● The extent to which Supreme Court nomination and confirmation is subject to a
political litmus test, especially at the expense of judicial qualifications and
expertise.

8

Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964)
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● The degree to which Supreme Court justices are polarized along the legal
spectrum.
By these measures, the Supreme Court of 2018 is extraordinarily politicized. While the
first and second factors will be addressed at length throughout the historical analysis
section, this chapter examines the following three in depth.
As an introduction, however, the first two factors are described at length in the
context of cases involving abortion, homosexuality, and other social hot button issues. In
these decisions, substantive due process in particular has been a primary (and largely
unjustifiable) mechanism for the Court to insert itself into the resolution of issues that are
often fundamentally nonjusticiable, resulting in the alienation of a significant sector of
social conservatives.
From the standpoint of liberals, however, perhaps the best illustration of the
Supreme Court reversing established modes was demonstrated by the majority decision
in Bush v. Gore (2000). This case held that there was an Equal Protection Clause
violation in using different standards of counting presidential votes for different Florida
counties.9 As a result, many Democrats railed the conservative block for alleged
hypocrisy at best and outright judicial activism at worst in employing a stringent reading
of a clause that is typically relished by liberals to “give” the Republican candidate,
George W. Bush, the election. 10 As such, it can hardly be said that only the conservative

9

Elspeth Reeve, "Just How Bad Was Bush v. Gore?" The Atlantic, November 29, 2010, accessed
December 20, 2018, https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2010/11/just-how-bad-was-bush-vgore/343247/.
10
Ibid.
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camp openly criticizes the Court’s decisions as political. Of course, this will also be
demonstrated historically, especially with respect to the Lochner era.
However, in line with the third factor outlined, the degree to which the
contemporary federal judiciary has been politicized is perhaps best illustrated by the 2016
presidential election (and its subsequent aftermath). In a Sacramento Bee article titled
“It’s the Nukes, Not the Supreme Court,” lifelong Republican and Roy P. Crocker
Professor of American Politics at Claremont McKenna College John J. Pitney describes
the difficulty of his decision not to vote along party lines for the first time in 35 years:
To anybody who says that the argument stops with the words, “Supreme Court,” I
offer two other words: “nuclear weapons.” The power to nominate justices is
important, but the power to wipe out all life on earth is even more important.
Maybe he doesn’t pine for Armageddon, but his [Mr. Trump’s] big mouth could
start a crisis that spins out of control. 11
Pitney continues to list the many reasons why the soon-to-be President-elect is unfit for
office. However, what is relevant to this thesis is not the fact that an unpolished, former
reality TV star became the 45th President of the United States: it is the degree to which
voters weighed the importance of the Supreme Court at the ballot box.
During the 2016 presidential campaign, People for the American Way, a left-wing
advocacy group, stated that “for the future of the Supreme Court, and for the rights of all
Americans, November 8, 2016, is truly judgment day.”12 The group compiled a
comprehensive report outlining the major areas in which the courts recently had—and

11

John J. Pitney Jr, "It's the Nukes, Not the Supreme Court," The Sacramento Bee, August 11, 2016,
Accessed March 19, 2018, http://www.sacbee.com/opinion/op-ed/article94872637.html.
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People For the American Way, "Judgment Day 2016: The Future of the Supreme Court as a Critical Issue
in the 2016 Presidential Election," People For the American Way, September 2015, Accessed February 19,
2018, http://www.pfaw.org/report/judgment-day-2016-the-future-of-the-supreme-court-as-a-critical-issuein-the-2016-presidential-election/.
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would continue to have—a tremendous role in determining public policy, namely: money
and politics; civil and voting rights; LGBT rights; as well as reproductive freedom and
women’s rights.13 While jurisprudence concerning these areas rests on a variety of federal
laws and constitutional provisions, several cases have undoubtedly been decided on a
conception of “natural rights” allegedly grounded in the Fourteenth and other
Amendments.
The Democratic presidential candidate herself reinforced strong rhetoric
surrounding the Supreme Court. In the third presidential debate, Hillary Clinton made her
stance clear:
We need a Supreme Court that will stand up on behalf of women's rights, on
behalf of the rights of the LGBT community, that will stand up and say “no” to
Citizens United, a decision that has undermined the election system in our country
because of the way it permits dark, unaccountable money to come into our
electoral system. 14
In addition, during an interview on the Tom Joyner Morning Show, Clinton pledged to
“look broadly and widely for people who represent the diversity of our country.” 15 As
such, while it is surely not an exclusively 21st century phenomenon, it is clear candidates
want their judicial nominations (particularly those to the Supreme Court) to reflect their
own political and social views.

13

Ibid.
Veronica Stracqualursi, "What Hillary Clinton Wants in a Supreme Court Justice," ABC News, October
24, 2016, Accessed October 14, 2017, http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/hillary-clinton-supreme-courtjustice/story?id=43014620.
15
Ibid.
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On the other hand, then-candidate Trump promised to appoint judges who would
“protect the Second Amendment” 16 and largely follow in Justice Scalia’s footsteps.17 And
while it is no secret that presidents have long nominated justices who are likely to rule in
their favor, it is rather shocking to examine how many prominent party leaders,
conservative organizations, and registered Republicans supported Trump solely over the
issue of the federal judiciary.
For example, former Republican primary candidate and Senator Ted Cruz (RTX), who once called Mr. Trump a “pathological liar,”18 eventually supported the
Republican nominee largely due to the perceived threat Hillary Clinton’s nominees
would pose to the conservative agenda: 19
For anyone concerned about the Bill of Rights—free speech, religious liberty, the
Second Amendment—the Court hangs in the balance. We are only one justice
away from losing our most basic rights, and the next president will appoint as
many as four new justices. We know, without a doubt, that every Clinton
appointee would be a left-wing ideologue.20
Former Speaker of the House John Boehner (R-OH) had a similar stance on why he
would be supporting Mr. Trump. In his mind, the decision was “pretty simple:” 21
The legislative process, the political process, is at a standstill and will be
regardless of who wins. The only thing that really matters over the next four
16

Politico Staff, "Full Transcript: Third 2016 Presidential Debate," Politico, October 20, 2016, Accessed
November 20, 2018, https://www.politico.com/story/2016/10/full-transcript-third-2016-presidential-debate230063.
17
Meet the Press, "Trump on Picking a Scalia Replacement," NBCNews.com, February 14, 2016, Accessed
January 20, 2018, https://www.nbcnews.com/meet-the-press/video/trump-on-picking-a-scalia-replacement622796355543.
18
Timothy P. Carney, "The 'but Judges!' Argument for Trump, and Why It Fails," Washington Examiner,
September 27, 2016, Accessed November 19, 2017, http://www.washingtonexaminer.com/the-but-judgesargument-for-trump-and-why-it-fails/article/2603011.
19
Ibid.
20
Ibid.
21
Russell Berman, "Why the Supreme Court Matters More to Republicans than Trump," The Atlantic,
October 14, 2016, Accessed October 19, 2017, https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/10/whythe-supreme-court-matters-more-to-republicans-than-trump/504038/.
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years or eight years is who is going to appoint the next Supreme Court
nominees…. The biggest impact any president can have on American society
and on the American economy is who is on that court. 22
While unfortunate, the classic establishment Republican who, in any other election year,
would have no business voting for Donald Trump, was precisely correct. With the
legislative arena gridlocked to the teeth, the judicial branch presented the next best
avenue to accomplish a political agenda. Mr. Trump recognized the Court’s importance
and, just four months before the election, articulated it loud and clear (in typical fashion,
speaking in third person) at a campaign stop in Cedar Rapids:
If you really like Donald Trump, that's great, but if you don't, you have to vote
for me anyway. You know why? Supreme Court judges, Supreme Court
judges. Have no choice, sorry, sorry, sorry. You have no choice. 23
It is undoubtedly clear that interest groups, the party establishment, and, most
importantly, the American public were listening.
According to exit polls, 21% of voters considered the Supreme Court to be the
“most important factor” when deciding how to cast their votes in the presidential
election.24 Of this group, 56% supported Mr. Trump. 25 Another 48% of voters considered
the factor to be “important.”26 In an election where the President-elect lost the popular
vote, it is possible that those who felt that they were voting (albeit indirectly) for a more
conservative Supreme Court may have made the difference.

22

Ibid., Emphasis added in bold.
David Frum, "The Supreme Court Isn't a Sufficient Reason to Vote for Trump," The Atlantic, August 04,
2016, Accessed November 5, 2017, https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/08/scotus-not-agood-reason-to-vote-trump/494630/. Emphasis added in bold.
24
CNN, "Exit Polls," CNN Politics, November 23, 2016, Accessed January 14, 2018,
https://www.cnn.com/election/2016/results/exit-polls.
25
Ibid.
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Ibid.
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It should be noted that some legal scholars regard the prominence of the
composition of the Supreme Court as an election issue as appropriate and positive. For
example, when I asked CNN senior legal analyst Jeffrey Toobin at Claremont McKenna
College in January 2018 about election rhetoric surrounding the judiciary, the frequent
television commentator spoke at length about how Americans should, in fact, be voting
for representatives who they believe will protect their rights. For this reason,
consideration of representatives’ views regarding Supreme Court justices is appropriate.
While a compelling case at first glance, this assertion presupposes that individuals
take the time to seriously consider whether their most cherished “rights” are, in fact,
constitutionally mandated. At best, Toobin’s picture is a rosy one. Americans are using
the democratic process to help protect the rule of law, rights of minorities, and other
constitutional provisions. At worst, the public—and their representatives—undermine the
sovereignty and integrity of the judicial branch in order to enact public policy under the
guise of legitimate legal interpretation.
Regardless of whether the composition of the Supreme Court should or should not
play so prominent a role in election politics, it is clear that the degree of attention focused
on this issue in the 2016 presidential election is atypical and indicative of the public’s
strong sense that the Supreme Court has failed to keep itself above the political fray. As
William G. Ross of the Samford University's Cumberland School of Law noted in an
academic commentary published in October 2012, 27 the Supreme Court had been an
important election issue only four times in the past 100 years. According to Ross, the

27

William G. Ross, "The Supreme Court Should Be a Key Election Issue," JURIST - Forum, October 31,
2012, Accessed October 21, 2017, http://www.jurist.org/forum/2012/10/william-ross-scotus-election.php.
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judiciary “has emerged as an important campaign issue only when the Court has alienated
a distinct bloc of voters with a broad range of issues.”28 In 1912 and 1924, the public
backlashed in response to the Court's nullification of progressive economic policies.29 In
1964 and 1968, the Warren Court's "liberal" decisions regarding the rights of criminal
defendants, racial desegregation, school-sponsored prayer, and voting district populations
became major election issues.30 In these elections, the Republican nominees (Barry
Goldwater and Richard Nixon, respectively) pledged to appoint justices who would
exercise judicial restraint. 31 And, while this thesis argues that today’s importance of the
Supreme Court as an election issue is in large part due to the institution’s expanded use of
substantive due process over the last several decades, the point nonetheless holds that it is
particularly prevalent compared to historical standards.
The third factor in assessing politicization relates to the degree to which the
appointment and confirmation of justices is subject to political manipulation that is
transparent to the public, as well as the extent to which political “litmus tests” are used in
vetting Supreme Court nominees. Following Justice Antonin Scalia’s death on February
13, 2016, Democrats were appalled when the majority Republican Senate refused to hold
hearings on President Obama’s nominee, Chief Judge of the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia Justice Merrick Garland.

28
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A study conducted by Professors Bradley Kar and Jason Mazzone deemed the
“snub” unprecedented in the nation’s constitutional history. 32 According to the study, in
all 103 cases where an elected president faced a Supreme Court vacancy before his
successor’s election, he successfully nominated and appointed a replacement Justice. 33 To
add gas to the flame, Senate Minority Leader Harry Reid (D-NV) said that his
Republican counterpart, Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell (R-KY), refused to
hold a hearing on Garland due to pressure from the billionaire Koch brothers. 34 And
while there is some debate whether the Republic action was truly as categorically novel
as the Kar and Mazzone report argues, 35 the politicization of the judicial appointment was
clear. According to a poll by NBC News and the Wall Street Journal, 36 more than half of
registered voters disapproved of the Republican action, while Senator Elizabeth Warren
denounced the act as an “insult to the Constitution” and one that morphed a solemn
Senatorial duty into a “crazy political process.” 37 If nothing else, this failed appointment
provides ample evidence that the Supreme Court—along with the rest of the federal
judiciary—is now viewed by Congress not as a third and equal arm of government, but as
an effective tool for creating, maintaining, and overruling public policy.

32

Robin Bradley Kar and Jason Mazzone, "The Garland Affair: What History and the Constitution Really
Say About President Obama’s Powers to Appoint a Replacement for Justice Scalia," SSRN Electronic
Journal, May 2016, 53-62, Accessed December 7, 2017, doi:10.2139/ssrn.2752287.
33
Ibid., 53.
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35
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June 13, 2016, Accessed October 17, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/14/us/politics/obamasupreme-court-merrick-garland.html.
36
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2016, Accessed October 18, 2017, https://www.cbsnews.com/news/elizabeth-warren-obama-supremecourt-nominee-election-2016/.
37
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Some political pundits argue that President Trump’s most lasting legacy in the
policy arena will not be his southern border wall, tax reform, or repeal of the Affordable
Care Act’s individual mandate, but the degree to which he has shaped (and will continue
to shape) the composition of the federal courts. After winning election, Trump nominated
more federal appeals judges to the bench in his first twelve months in office than any
other President (and four times as many as Barack Obama in his first year).38 Upon
reaching the historic mark, Faith and Freedom Coalition Executive Director Tim Head
declared that, due to the President and Senate Republicans’ efforts, the “federal judiciary
is being reshaped for an entire generation.” 39 Especially in light of the following chart, 40
the impact these lifetime appointments will have on the judiciary’s composition should
not be understated.

38

Tessa Berenson, "Donald Trump Set a Record for Confirming Federal Judges," Time, December 15,
2017, Accessed October 18, 2018, http://time.com/5066679/donald-trump-federal-judges-record/.
39
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Charlie Savage, "Trump Is Rapidly Reshaping the Judiciary. Here's How," The New York Times,
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As of January 19, 2018, the Senate had confirmed 23 of the President’s Article III
nominees, including Neil Gorsuch, a conservative, textualist, 50 year old former Circuit
Court of Appeals Judge for the 10th Circuit. 41 At the time of his confirmation, Mr.
Gorsuch was the youngest successful nominee since Clarence Thomas.42 Following
Senate Democrats’ filibuster of Mr. Gorsuch’s nomination, Sen. McConnell employed
the so-called “nuclear option” in order to confirm the Justice. This action, which cut the
votes necessary to confirm the Supreme Court Justice from 60 to a simple majority, was
the first time the process had been used to push a judge through to the highest federal
court.43
Overall, the practice of appointing judges and justices that share the President’s
political orientation is not a new one: As discussed above, the practice dates from the
time of Marbury vs. Madison. The extent to which the number of judicial nominees put in
place by President Trump is troubling depends largely on one’s political orientation.
What is of note in the context of the present analysis is the degree nominations appear to
be subject to a political litmus test and without regard to judicial qualification. Four of
President Trump’s nominees for judicial positions in his first year in office were rated as
“not qualified” by the American Bar Association.44 One of these, Brett J. Talley, a
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nominee for a federal judgeship in Alabama, eventually withdrew his name after it was
revealed that he had never tried a case, was unanimously rated “not qualified" by the
American Bar Association's judicial rating committee, had practiced law for only three
years, and had posted highly partisan posts on the internet. 45 Another nominee, Matthew
Spencer Petersen (who had never tried a jury or civil case), went viral on the internet
after he struggled to answer basic legal questions posed to him by Republican Senator
Neely Kennedy (R-LA).46 Charges have been raised by scholars such as Russell Wheeler
from the Brookings Institution that Trump nominees are more consistently conservative
due to the extensive vetting responsibility given to the Federalist Society, 47 which holds
strong financial ties to conservative donors such as the Koch Brothers. 48
The fifth factor to be considered in determining the degree of Supreme Court
politicization relates to the extent of polarization among members of the bench itself.
According to research conducted by Atlantic writer David Paul Kuhn, less than 2% of
Supreme Court rulings were decided by single vote margins from 1804-1940.49 In 2012,
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the statistic was 20%. 50 Thus there is at least some quantitative evidence that the Supreme
Court is increasingly polarized.
Many academics and researchers have attempted to put numbers to the
phenomenon of increased polarization among the American public. According to the
“DW-NOMINATE” metric developed by Professors Keith Poole and Howard Rosenthal,
Congress is more polarized today than any time since reconstruction. 51 Nor is Congress
unrepresentative in this regard. As demonstrated by a 2014 study conducted by the Pew
Research Center, 52 Americans were more ideologically divided then than in several
decades. Perhaps even more concerning, in recent years, each party is increasingly
viewing the other as a “threat to the nation’s well-being.”53 While there is significant
debate as to whether the ideological divide that characterizes the public today caused the
polarization of the political parties in Congress—or vice versa—it appears clear that both
the people and their representatives are moving away from the prospect of compromise.
It certainly makes sense that as members of Congress and the public have become
more polarized, the judiciary might follow suit. However, while it is difficult to quantify
politicization in the legislative arena, it is perhaps even more so in the judicial realm. The
most well-known standard for assessing judicial ideology is the Martin-Quinn score,
developed by Professors Andrew Martin and Kevin Quinn. Using their statistical
algorithm, the two graphed each Supreme Court Justice’s ideological position on a scale
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of -8 (most liberal) to 8 (most conservative). 54 Indeed, as demonstrated by the following
chart,55 it appears that the “gap” between justices, as well as the standard deviations, has
grown since roughly the mid-1960s, when substantive due process was revived in
“personal liberty” cases.

In conclusion, based on the working definition of politicization proposed, it
appears that today’s Supreme Court is broadly viewed as highly politicized. This paper
does not argue that the substantive due process is the sole or even necessarily the primary
cause of our highly politicized and polarized court. It does, however, assert that the
doctrine is the primary means by which the Court justifies incorrect decisions that are
constitutionally designed to remain in the legislative arena, thereby courting the kind of
politicization described above.
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Section Two: Exploring the Constitutional Merits of Substantive
Due Process
Initial Remarks
This section of the thesis focuses on providing an overview of substantive due
process or “natural rights” jurisprudence. In doing so, it addresses the following
questions:
● What is substantive due process?
● How is the doctrine’s legitimacy tied to modes of constitutional interpretation?
● Is the doctrine supported by the Constitution—either by the Fifth or Fourteenth
Amendment Due Process Clauses or by references to unenumerated rights within
the Ninth Amendment?
● Do contemporary sources suggest that some notion of substantive due process
may reasonably be “read into” the Constitution?

What is Substantive Due Process?
In examining the legitimacy of substantive due process, it is first necessary to
develop a working definition of the term. Interestingly, as argued by Professor John
Harrison at the University of Virginia, “the textual pedigree of substantive due process
has no definitive judicial articulation-there is no Marbury, no McCulloch, for substantive
due process.”56 In the absence of an authoritative description, the doctrine is often defined
in juxtaposition to procedural due process, which is explicitly protected by the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments. Specifically, the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause
prohibits the federal government from depriving any person of “life, liberty, or property,
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without due process of law.”57 The Fourteenth Amendment extends that prohibition to the
states.
Director of the William E. and Carol G. Simon Center on Religion and the
Constitution at the Witherspoon Institute, Professor Matthew Franck, articulates the
distinction between procedural and substantive due process as follows:
A procedural right is one that requires the government to enforce its policies—it
matters not what they are—in such a way and by such processes that we are
treated fairly under the rules laid down. A substantive right is a right against the
imposition of certain kinds of policies on us under any circumstances—in this
instance it mattering a great deal what the policies are, therefore, and there being
no “right way,” no rules laid down, that can render the policy itself legitimate. 58
Thus, procedural due process merely asks whether the government has followed proper
legal channels before taking a punitive measure. Justice Scalia put his explanation
simply:
Now, what does this guarantee? Does it guarantee life, liberty or property? No,
indeed! All three can be taken away. You can be fined, you can be incarcerated,
you can even be executed, but not without due process of law. It’s a procedural
guarantee.59
Indeed, from a grammatical standpoint, the clause’s language is clear. To use an analogy,
suppose instead that it read, “No employer shall terminate an employee, reduce hours, or
change insurance plans without first submitting a two week, advance notice to the
Department of Labor.” This does not mean a department manager at Amazon is
prohibited from firing the consistently late delivery truck driver, moving shifts around, or
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re-evaluating its contract with Blue Cross. Furthermore, such a clause would certainly not
grant the delivery driver paid paternity leave, 2x overtime pay, or a 401(k) match.
Nonetheless, this is precisely the kind of interpretation the Supreme Court has
read into the Constitution through its use of substantive due process. In general, the
doctrine asks “whether” or “what” instead of “how.” It asks, as Professor Erwin
Chemerinsky put it in a 1999 speech at Duke University, “whether the government’s
deprivation of a person’s life, liberty or property is justified by a sufficient purpose… a
good enough reason for such a deprivation.” 60 Since the doctrine is only employed when
laws are purportedly adverse to notions of “ordered liberty” or “natural rights,” this paper
uses the terms substantive due process and natural rights jurisprudence interchangeably.
In undertaking a substantive due process analysis, then, the courts first determine
whether a right is fundamental and, if it is, requires a compelling, narrowly tailored
interest to be curtailed. 61 By contrast, there only has to be rational basis for legislation to
infringe upon non-fundamental rights, including, for example, economic rights. 62 In this
manner, courts take on the responsibility of “weighing” the interests of the state and the
individual whose substantive due process rights are at issue, giving more or less latitude
to the state, depending on whether the “right” is fundamental. Of course, this kind of
interest “weighing” is precisely what legislatures do—explicitly or implicitly—when they
enact public policy. Nonetheless, the doctrine is likely an attractive one to justices
confronted by laws that, on their face, appear to be unjust or repugnant, since the concept
60

Erwin Chemerinsky, Substantive Due Process, 15 Touro Law Review 1501 (1999), Available at:
https://schoalrship.law.duke.edu/faculty_scholarship/718. The source is an article written by Sydney M.
Irmas, Professor of Law and Political Science at the University of Southern California Law School based
on a transcript of Professor Chemerinsky’s speech.
61
Ibid., 1501-1534.
62
Ibid., 1501-1534.

23

gives them the authority to find the law inconsistent with fundamental notions of liberty
and to invalidate it on those grounds.
However, in the words of Justice Scalia, “the judge who always likes the results
he reaches is a bad judge.”63 Substantive due process provides judges with wide-ranging
authority to do what may very well be morally or ethically preferable. But at what
expense in terms of the Court’s credibility? The words used in both the Due Process
Clauses are readily understandable: On their faces, they do not suggest or imply anything
further than the requirement that the government use properly constructed, followed, and
fair processes before depriving a person of life, liberty, or property. Reading a meaning
that so substantially expands the power of the judiciary comes at a great cost in terms of
the court’s legitimacy in the eyes of the public. Before fully expounding the politicizing
effects natural rights jurisprudence has on the court, however, this paper first examines
the doctrine’s constitutional legitimacy.

Substantive Due Process and Constitutional Interpretation
Because the concept of substantive due process has no support in the literal
language of the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendments, but rather finds its foundation in
natural rights jurisprudence, any discussion of the doctrine must first commence by
determining whether a textualist, originalist, or “living Constitution” mode of legal
interpretation is most appropriate. This thesis employs a textualist approach to reading
the law, reflecting the view that, while imperfect, this is the best means of discovering the
“true” meaning of a given statute. Under this form of analysis, the judicial branch (and all
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others, for that matter) should first and foremost prioritize the letter and structure of the
text when wrangling with its implications. Only when the language itself is vague or
unclear are other supplemental historical sources permissible in order to discover what
the law means.
Why? Because while particular framers’ intents, regional and temporal
circumstances, or the understanding of the “public” might change, the letter of the law
remains unless and until it is amended. As such, the words themselves are “dead” rather
than living—or, as the late Justice Scalia preferred, “enduring.” 64 In contrast to various
modes of originalism, a textualist first and foremost prioritizes the words of the law
themselves rather than the intent of its ratifiers, the public, or any other body involved in
the statute’s passage. As such, it is “law that governs, not the intent of the lawgiver.” 65
However, a heightened sense of respect for the language of the text itself need not
confine judges to overly simplistic, at-times silly interpretations of the law. Take, for
example, the Free Exercise Clause within the First Amendment, which states: “Congress
shall make no law… prohibiting the free exercise thereof [religion].” 66 If a religious
organization mandated murder of infidels as a requisite for admission to the church, a
“strict constructionist” might be compelled to interpret the First Amendment in such a
manner that disobeys Congress from prohibiting a capital offense. I, along with other
textualists, would defend no such reading. Rather, the words themselves should neither
be blanketly interpreted broadly or narrowly, but reasonably. 67
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With respect to substantive due process, Justice Scalia argued at a CSPANtelevised presentation at the Woodrow Wilson Center that, with the doctrine, “the Court
has essentially liberated itself from the text of the Constitution, from the text and even
from the traditions of the American people.”68 Indeed, one need not be an originalist—
one who strictly interprets the constitutional clauses in line with how their adopters
would have understood them—to refute substantive due process under the Fifth or
Fourteenth Amendments. Instead, one simply must demand solid textual backing from
the founding document.
Nonetheless, natural rights jurisprudence and “living Constitution” theory are
integrally related, and they are both well regarded by a great many justices and scholars
in the legal community. Rather than employing historical or textual arguments,
proponents of a “fluid” or “evolving” Constitution often emphasize three primary
arguments in its favor in relation to alternatives: 1) It is more practical or prudent given
our modern political environment, 2) The Constitution itself does not outline a singular,
proper mode of interpretation, and there is little historical evidence to suggest that the
Framers expected future generations to employ a strictly originalist framework, and 3) In
addition to rules and procedures, the Constitution elucidates various underlying
“principles,” which, similarly to our governing system, were meant to endure over time.
Each of these is addressed below.
According to David Strauss, Gerald Ratner Distinguished Service Professor of
Law at the University of Chicago, given the difficulty of the amendment process, it is
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unreasonable to expect the Constitution to “keep up” with modern advancements in
technology, social norms, economic transformation, and international globalization.69
Indeed, the Framers could hardly have anticipated 21st century issues related to internet
surveillance and due process, the extraordinary capability of today’s guns and individual
rights to bear them, as well as a multitude of other constitutional dilemmas born out of
social evolution and technological innovation.
For this reason, one of the central arguments in favor of incorporating modern
society’s views when evaluating the constitutionality of a given law is that doing so
provides “flexibility.” In this manner, the Constitution remains “workable” in the 21st
century. When Justices Breyer and Scalia testified during a Senate Judiciary hearing in
2011, the liberal defender of a living Constitution asserted that the danger of originalism
“is interpreting those words in a way that they will no longer work for a country of 308
million Americans who are living in the 21st century—work in the way those framers
would have wanted them to work had they been able to understand our society." 70 By
employing his framework, Justice Breyer contends the Court maintains legitimacy in the
eyes of the American public.
Notably, this argument underemphasizes the mechanisms explicitly included by
the Founders for ensuring that the Constitution remains sufficiently flexible to
accommodate changing times: the framework for a limited federal government and the
amendment process itself. Indeed, while the text of the Constitution might very well be
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inconvenient for the ultimate settlement of public policy issues, the suggestion that it
cannot “work for the people of today” is unfounded due to the document’s amendability.
The original Constitution of 1776 was one of the most democratic of its time, and its
subsequent amendments (most notably the Seventeenth, Nineteenth, Twenty Fourth, and
Twenty Sixth) have made it even more so without the help of judicial intervention.
And, while it is fair to say that the process for amending the Constitution is
relatively difficult, it is by no means impossible. Since the ratification of the Bill of
Rights in 1791, the Constitution has been modified by 17 different times. Thus, since
then, there has been roughly one amendment passed every 13 years (albeit none since the
passage of the 27th Amendment in 1992). For this reason, although constitutional
amendments often come in waves, as they did during Reconstruction and from 19101933, the process is certainly surmountable.
Furthermore, negation of substantive due process does not necessarily prohibit a
more expansive reading of other constitutional provisions. The powers delegated to the
federal government have grown enormously since the Great Depression and World War
II. Without the New Deal, Social Security, and other federal programs that were
previously deemed outside the scope of congressional authority, it is quite likely that the
country would not have moved forward the way it did. However, while programs may
have been struck down under a strictly originalist reading of the Constitution, they did
have solid textual backing under either the Interstate Commerce or Necessary and Proper
Clauses. As the final section argues, a more open-ended reading of other constitutional
provisions readily addresses many of the practical issues proponents of substantive due
process allege.
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Moreover, rather than enhancing the credibility of the Court, as proponents of the
“living Constitution” approach argue, judicial distortion of the plain meaning of the text
as well as far-ranging contemporary interpretation of various fundamental “principles”
has done enormous damage to the institution's image. Various examples of this
phenomenon will be examined in the historical analysis.
Second, proponents of living Constitution theory also rightly point out that the
Constitution itself does not specify any particular interpretative scheme justices must (or
should) abide. Indeed, Article III is extremely vague in its articulation of the judicial
branch: “The Judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one Supreme Court,
and in such inferior courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish.” 71
What precisely is meant by the “judicial power”—as well as its limits—is far from clear.
For example, the classic debate over judicial supremacy versus departmentalism is one
instance in which scholars often turn to other sections of the Constitution, as well as
legislative history, in order to form opinions.
Along these lines, the Framers were well aware (or, at the very least, hopeful) that
the government they were setting the foundations for would last long after they were no
longer around to explain the founding document’s meaning. In ratifying the Constitution,
did they truly expect judges to make their attempts at “time traveling” into the minds of
men who lived centuries earlier? It would seem that Jefferson, as demonstrated in a letter
to Samuel Kercheval, fully expected—and in fact believed it beneficial—for times and
institutions to progress alongside society itself:
I am certainly not an advocate for frequent and untried changes in laws and
constitutions. I think moderate imperfections had better be borne with;
71
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because, when once known, we accommodate ourselves to them, and find
practical means of correcting their ill effects. But I know also, that laws and
institutions must go hand in hand with the progress of the human mind. As that
becomes more developed, more enlightened, as new discoveries are made, new
truths disclosed, and manners and opinions change with the change of
circumstances, institutions must advance also, and keep pace with the times.
We might as well require a man to wear still the coat which fitted him when a
boy, as civilized society to remain ever under the regimen of their barbarous
ancestors.72
Supporters of an evolving Constitution often emphasize the final three sentences of this
passage, which is on Panel 4 of the Jefferson Memorial. 73 However, the reference to
changing “laws and constitutions” would seem to imply that there must be a deliberate,
systematic process by which these changes take hold. So yes, in addition to Justice John
Marshall, the Framers were well aware that they were expounding a Constitution to last
for centuries. However, this does not mean its meaning was somehow malleable without
a formal amendment process.
With respect to the final argument proposed, it is readily admitted that the
Constitution elucidates various principles in addition to rules and procedures for a new
system of government. Checks and balances, republicanism, and federalism are all
institutional principles that are reasonably inferred from the words of the document as
well as those of the Founders. For more individual or “personal” principles, one need not
look further than the First Amendment: It is indeed difficult to argue that Congress’s
prohibition on infringement of the freedom of the press, speech, or peaceful assembly are
rules in the same sense as “make your bed before school.” Instead, the First Amendment
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outlines various broadly articulated individual rights against the federal government that
require reasonable interpretation to properly understand. Why should the allusion to other
concepts such as unenumerated rights in the Ninth Amendment, the “ends” articulated in
the preamble, or others be so different?
The answer to this question is that when the Court is given license to adjudicate
immensely broad concepts such as “liberty,” it begins to look far more like a legislature
than a tribunal. Nonetheless, under a textualist framework, the remainder of this section
recognizes the possibility that the Ninth Amendment lends natural rights jurisprudence
some credibility. However, when viewed in relation to the politicization that the
understanding causes (fully articulated in the third section), this paper argues that such an
interpretation affords the Constitution a serious flaw.

Substantive Due Process and the Bill of Rights
The notion of “natural rights” has long historical roots within American
constitutional history. Indeed, the concept was foundational to such early influencers as
Locke, Voltaire, and Rousseau. These thinkers had extraordinary impacts on several
Framers, including Thomas Jefferson. Perhaps our early nation’s greatest writer,
Jefferson made these ideals clear in the Declaration of Independence:
We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they
are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable rights, that among these
are life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness. That to secure these rights,
governments are instituted among men, deriving their just powers from the
consent of the governed. 74
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It might seem odd, then, that our nation’s preeminent legal document would disregard the
protection of these natural rights in light of the Framers’ high regard for them. Especially
from this excerpt, it appears clear that our forefathers envisioned a society where
“liberty” would serve as the foundation of good government. According to Edward Erler,
senior fellow at the Claremont Institute:
Madison also wrote that the purpose of the Constitution was grounded in “the
transcendent law of nature and nature’s God, which declares that the safety and
happiness of society are the objects at which all political institutions aim and to
which all such institutions must be sacrificed.” Everyone, of course, recognizes
this statement as a paraphrase of the Declaration of Independence. Madison
clearly says here and other places in The Federalist that the principles of the
Declaration supply the ends or purposes of the Constitution and that
institutions—structures—are subordinate to the ends. There can be little doubt
that this was the understanding of the Founding generation. 75
Indeed, Federalist No. 51 stated that “justice is the end of government. It is the end of
civil society. It ever has been and ever will be pursued until it be obtained, or until liberty
be lost in the pursuit.”76 Thus, Professor Erler may, in fact, be correct in asserting that the
Framers viewed the Constitution as a means to achieve the ends articulated in the
Declaration of Independence. Insofar as this end is “justice,” one could contend that the
courts have a role to play in the defense of so-called natural rights.
Furthermore, it is true that by 1798—not long after ratification of the
Constitution—the Supreme Court was considering questions related to natural law that,
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today, would likely be framed in terms of substantive due process. While the decision
makes no reference to the Fifth Amendment or its Due Process Clause (in fact, the case
was ultimately decided on the interpretation of Article I’s ex-post facto clause), the
notion that legislatures simply cannot take certain actions regardless of whether they are
expressly prohibited by the Constitution was famously expounded in Justice Samuel
Chase’s Calder v. Bull (1798) decision:
I cannot subscribe to the omnipotence of a State Legislature, or that it is absolute
and without control; although its authority should not be expressly restrained
by the Constitution, or fundamental law, of the State. The people of the United
States erected their Constitutions, or forms of government, to establish justice, to
promote the general welfare, to secure the blessings of liberty; and to protect their
persons and property from violence... The nature, and ends of legislative power
will limit the exercise of it. There are acts which the Federal, or State,
Legislature cannot do, without exceeding their authority. There are certain vital
principles in our free Republican governments, which will determine and overrule an apparent and flagrant abuse of legislative power; as to authorize manifest
injustice by positive law; or to take away that security for personal liberty, or
private property, for the protection whereof of the government was established.
An ACT of the Legislature (for I cannot call it a law) contrary to the great
first principles of the social compact, cannot be considered a rightful exercise
of legislative authority.77
Although he concurred in the decision, Justice James Iredell vehemently rebutted the
view articulated by his colleague:
The ideas of natural justice are regulated by no fixed standard: the ablest and the
purest men have differed upon the subject; and all that the Court could properly
say, in such an event, would be, that the Legislature (possessed of an equal right
of opinion) had passed an act which, in the opinion of the judges, was inconsistent
with the abstract principles of natural justice. 78
While the doctrine may not have had the same, formal title it does today, it is clear that
the fundamental question whether the federal judiciary should be the bulwarks of
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natural—as well as man-made—law is reflected in the earliest days of the Court’s history.
It is equally clear that, even so shortly after ratification of the Constitution, there was no
consensus among jurists that the Bill of Rights provided protection for rights not
specifically enumerated in the Constitution.

Substantive Due Process under the Fifth Amendment
It should be emphasized up front that the meaning of “substantive” due process
has changed over time. Furthermore, what is regarded as a procedural question to a
particular scholar may very well be deemed more substantive in nature to another,
depending on how strictly one interprets “process.” Sharswood Fellow and Professor of
Law at the University of Pennsylvania Ryan Williams contends that the phrase “due
process” originated out of developments in the English Magna Carta in 1215. 79
Originally, the text read that no freeman would be deprived of rights except, “by the
judgement of his peers and by the law of the land.” 80 Later, “law of the land” was
superseded by “due process of law.” 81 At this stage, Lord Edward Coke, who would later
become Chief Justice of England and Wales, regarded the two phrases to be synonymous
and wrote that: “the power and jurisdiction of the parliament, for making of laws” was
“so transcendent and absolute” as to be boundless.” 82 As we will see, various
contemporary scholars have argued that the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments have very different meanings today (and from each other).
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Regardless of its historical origins, it is indisputable that the plain language of the
Fifth (or Fourteenth) Amendment does not vest the Due Process Clauses with substantive
meaning. Furthermore, there is no solid body of evidence suggesting that the Fifth
Amendment was intended to impose substantive, in addition to a procedural, limitations
on the Federal Government’s exercise of power. In its entirety, the Amendment states:
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime,
unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in
the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of War or
public danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put
in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a
witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without
just compensation. 83
The majority of the text outlines various rules and procedures for indictment. As such, it
is entirely sensible for the Amendment to conclude with a prohibition against punishment
without “due process” of law. In this manner, the Fifth Amendment encapsulates the
protection of other processes that the Congress or, perhaps, the judiciary, may deem
necessary to protect. Indeed, at the time of the framing, the Constitution was not seen as
having judiciable limitations with respect to “due process of law.” 84 This was also the
stance taken by influencers such as William Blackstone, Justice Joseph, Story, and
Chancellor James Kent. 85
Others, such as Timothy Sandefur, Lincoln Fellow at the Claremont Institute, read
the Fifth Amendment differently. According to him, the word “law” implies something
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more than merely a provision or policy properly passed in accordance with relevant
procedures. Instead, the word itself has a substantive element: “Law is the use of
government power in the service of a rational, general, public principle.”86 As such,
arbitrary, malicious, or otherwise irrational public policies, regardless of how dutifully
they followed the proper procedures for passage, are not truly “law” (as we will see, this
is what Justice Taney meant in his Dred Scott decision).
This argument is not particularly compelling because virtually every court and
legislature throughout American history has recognized the existence of bad, unjust, or
poorly executed laws. Indeed, an even greater majority of the public would recognize this
to be the case, as well. Furthermore, as noted by Professor Rosenthal at Chapman
University, the Constitution itself recognizes in Article I that if a bill is passed by both
Houses of Congress and signed by the Chief Executive (or if the President’s veto is
overridden by the Senate), “it shall become Law” regardless of its nature. 87 Thus, while
perhaps the high-browed perspective of a minority of legal scholars, for all intents and
purposes, a bill becomes a law once it meets the procedural requirements to do so. In
other words, its substance is irrelevant. As one might suspect, this was the case in 1791 as
it is today. For this reason, unless one is willing to indulge in extraordinary linguistic
manipulation, the Fifth Amendment provides neither a textual nor historical basis for
substantive due process.

Natural Rights under the Ninth and Tenth Amendments
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While many scholars disagree about the proper interpretation of the Ninth (and, to
a lesser extent, Tenth) Amendment, its history is relatively clear. In response to concerns
about the enlarging scope of federal power under the new Constitution, Anti-Federalists
sought to enshrine within it a formal Bill of Rights. 88 One of the nation’s most resolute
patriots and vehement opponents of the federal constitution, Patrick Henry, believed that
in addition to grossly expanding the scope of the federal government, the Constitution did
not protect fundamental liberties:
Will the abandonment of your most sacred rights tend the security of your liberty?
Liberty, the greatest of all earthly blessings—give us that precious jewel and you
may take everything else. But I fear I have lived long enough to become an oldfashioned fellow. Perhaps an invincible attachment to the dearest rights of man
may, in these refined, enlightened days, be deemed old-fashioned: if so, I am
contented to be so.89
Henry’s deep concern for the liberties that he feared the Constitution might
disenfranchise stems from a valid historical argument: "that all nations have adopted this
construction-that all rights not expressly and unequivocally reserved to the people are
impliedly and incidentally relinquished to rulers, as necessarily inseparable from the
delegated powers."90 By failing to include a Bill of Rights (as well as an amendment
explaining that their description was not meant to be exhaustive), Anti-Federalists feared
the consequences of the new framing document.
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Meanwhile, Federalists viewed the Constitution from a very different perspective.
As they saw it, the narrowly tailored document was necessary in order for the federal
government to accomplish specific goals. Thus, in contrast to the Anti-Federalists
understanding of state constitutions that "invested their representatives with every right
and authority which they [the people] did not in explicit terms reserve,"91 the framing of
the federal government implied precisely the opposite. It would mean, as James Wilson
put it, that “everything that is not given, is reserved.”As such, a Bill of Rights was either
redundant or superfluous. 92
Federalists further argued the enumeration of various rights might be used to
expand the scope of federal power by implication in the future. For example, Alexander
Hamilton famously remarked that the amendments were “not only unnecessary in the
proposed constitution, but would even be dangerous.”93 At the 1788 Virginia Convention,
James Madison articulated that by “enumerating particular exceptions to the grant of
power… it might follow by implication, that those rights which were not singled out,
were intended to be assigned into the hands of the General Government.” 94 As such, the
Ninth Amendment was intended to protect the “great residium of rights” not delegated to
that newly formed government. In a similar fashion, the Tenth Amendment reinforces the
notion that the great residium of powers shall be left to the states.
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It is due in large part to the Ninth and Tenth Amendments’ historical context that
many scholars regard their inclusion to the Bill of Rights as largely symbolic, rather than
substantive. As put by Professor McAffee, a leading scholar on the subject, the Ninth
Amendment “is the unique product of the struggle to ratify the Constitution and, more
specifically, the ratification-period debate over the omission of a bill of rights from the
Constitution drafted by the Philadelphia convention.”95 Indeed, if its addition merely
served to ensure that the federal government would not go off-the-walls in doing things
not explicitly prohibited (but also not expressly granted by Article I), originalists can
make a strong argument that “natural rights” had little relevance to its passage at all.
Rather, the final two amendments exclusively sought to maintain a firm system of
federalism in response to the monarchical form of rule from which the new nation
recently achieved autonomy. The “old orthodoxy,” as put by McAffee, concerning the
Ninth Amendment, then, is the proper reading: “The unenumerated rights... are the rights
of the people reserved by the device of listing granted powers.” 96 In other words, the
Ninth Amendment serves a two-fold purpose: 1) To ensure that the federal government
does not imply that the enumeration of various rights may be used to extend its own
authority passed the powers granted by Article I, and 2) To protect the legitimate addition
of those rights that future generations may feel were not protected by the original
constitutional text.
As noted previously, however, the Ninth Amendment provides more ample
textual evidence for the assertion that, as part of the “judicial power,” the federal courts
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must protect natural rights (or, at the very least, various unenumerated rights) in addition
to those that are explicitly spelled out. The text states:
The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to
deny or disparage others retained by the people. 97
As mentioned, many scholars contend that this is largely an instruction regarding how the
new federal government should be understood: as one with exclusively enumerated and
limited powers. However, as the following historical analysis section will show, several
liberal justices have interpreted a robust, substantive meaning to the Ninth Amendment,
including Justice Arthur Goldberg in his concurring Griswold v. Connecticut (1965)
opinion:
the Ninth Amendment, in indicating that not all such liberties are specifically
mentioned in the first eight amendments, is surely relevant in showing the
existence of other fundamental personal rights, now protected from state, as
well as federal, infringement. 98
Absent this interpretation, the Ninth Amendment indeed serves largely a repetitive,
affirmatory purpose. This is especially true in light of the following Tenth Amendment,
which states: “The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor
prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.” 99
Indeed, the most solid grounds for those who support judicial protection of
alleged natural rights such as those of property, liberty of contract, privacy, dignity, or
otherwise is within an amendment that never mentions the phrase “due process.” The
most compelling textual foundation, in fact, is to be found within the Ninth Amendment.
The argument is clear and simple: 1) The Constitution affirms not only the existence, but
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the peoples’ retention of unenumerated rights 2) Insofar as these rights exist, regardless
of how difficult it may be to discern precisely what they are, the courts have a
responsibility to protect them against legislative or executive encroachments. Based
exclusively on the grammar and structure of the Ninth Amendment, this is, in fact, a solid
textualist argument.
A slightly different but nonetheless related argument is put forth by Randy
Barnett, a self-proclaimed originalist and Professor of Law at Georgetown University. In
his article published in the Texas Law Review titled “The Ninth Amendment: It Means
What It Says,” Barnett employs historical sources to assert that “the purpose of the Ninth
Amendment was to ensure the equal protection of unenumerated individual natural rights
on a par with those individual natural rights that came to be listed ‘for greater caution’ in
the Bill of Rights.”100 Indeed, the Framers’ writings are filled with allusions to
government’s solemn duty to protect inalienable rights. As such, depending on how
directly sources are connected, there is an abundance of evidence to draw from to support
the assertion that natural rights were intended to be protected under the Ninth
Amendment. This is, of course, readily contested by various scholars, including
McAffee:
Indeed, in the midst of the ratification-era debate over the advantages and
disadvantages of express and implied reservations and enumerated powers and
enumerated rights, there was virtually no discussion of the force of natural rights
standing alone. This is, no doubt, because the crux of the debate was how best to
secure these rights in positive law… Indeed, the ratification materials seem to
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cut against the view that at the time of the founding there was a clear
consensus in favor of the concept of enforceable unwritten limitations. 101
Of course, the language has also been read other ways. Rather than placing the
emphasis on the possibility of other rights retained by the people, one can prioritize the
phraseology concerning “deny and disaparge.” According to Justice Scalia, the Ninth
Amendment’s prohibition on denying or disparaging other rights “is far removed from
affirming any one of them, and even further removed from authorizing judges to identify
what they might be, and to enforce the judges’ list against laws duly enacted by the
people.”102 This argument, however, is unconvincing. Insofar as justices refuse to accept
or protect a “right”—natural or municipal—they are, in fact, denying it.
Another understanding put forth by Robert Bork during his Senate confirmation
hearings was that the Ninth Amendment served to ensure that the enumeration of federal
rights would not be used to disparage those protected by states under their respective
constitutions.103 To be sure, this would parlay well into the Ninth Amendment’s history.
In response to rising federal authority, states would want to ensure that their ability to
protect additional rights would be protected.
Given the plethora of divided theories, it is difficult to discern a single, clearly
defined “meaning” of the Ninth Amendment. At the very least, then, from both a
textualist and originalist standpoint, the waters are rather murky. Furthermore, they are
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increasingly so depending on which sources are prioritized as well as what mode of
originalism (framers intent, public understanding, etc.) is employed.
And, while the constitutional merits of natural rights jurisprudence are hazy,
deciphering what, precisely is protected under such a doctrine is even more so. Perhaps
the most illustrative metaphor for this difficulty was exemplified by Judge Robert Bork
during his Senate confirmation hearings. In response to questions from Senator Dennis
DeConcini (D-Ariz.), Bork stated:
I do not think you can use the Ninth Amendment unless you know something of
what it means. For example, if you had an amendment that says “Congress shall
make no” and then there is an ink blot and you cannot read the rest of it and that is
the only copy you have, I do not think the court can make up what might be under
the ink blot if you cannot read it. 104
And, while Judge Bork was referring to the Ninth Amendment as somewhat of an “ink
blot” rather than the notion of natural rights itself, the point holds true nonetheless. What,
exactly, is natural right? As the following section will argue, the Court’s use of natural
rights jurisprudence to overturn acts of various legislatures has undermined the
institution’s legitimacy and politicized it immensely. First, however, it is necessary to
examine whether substantive due process is supported by the Fourteenth Amendment.

Substantive Due Process under the Fourteenth Amendment
The language of the Due Process Clause in the Fourteenth Amendment is nearly
identical to that in the Fifth: “...Nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law.”105 Thus, the textualist argument put forth in the
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previous chapter remains relevant. On its face, the Amendment does not imply that there
are liberties—“fundamental” or otherwise—that the state simply cannot take away.
However, several scholars have argued that under an originalist interpretative
framework, the Due Process Clause within the Reconstruction Amendment does, in fact,
have a more substantive component. Indeed, since the concept of natural rights and due
process continued to evolve in the decades following the Bull decision, it is necessary to
analyze whether, by the time of the Fourteenth Amendment, the meaning of the clause
had so evolved as to support today’s substantive due process jurisprudence. Throughout
the 1800s courts and lawyers began to accept more novel interpretations of the clause in
order to incorporate a theory of natural rights into the Constitution. 106 According to an
article published by Williams in the Yale Law Journal, by 1868 a “recognizable form of
substantive due process had been embraced by courts in 20 of the 37 then-existing states
as well as by the United States Supreme Court.” 107
However, the kind of “substantive” due process Williams argues pre-dates the
Fourteenth Amendment is very different from the “fundamental” liberty jurisprudence
that has become widely accepted in the 21st century. He argues that the pre-civil war due
process cases appear to come in two primary forms: “vested rights” and “general law”
due process. The former suggests that there are certain “vested rights” that cannot be
retroactively impacted by legislation. As Alexander Hamilton put it: “The proposition,
that a power to do, includes virtually, a power to undo, as applied to a legislative body, is

106

Ryan C. Williams, "The One and Only Substantive Due Process Clause," The Yale Law Journal 120, no.
3 (December 2010): 408, https://www.yalelawjournal.org/article/the-one-and-only-substantive-dueprocess-clause.
107
Ibid.

44

generally but not universally true. All vested rights form an exception to the rule.” 108
Thus, in addition to obviously ex-post facto laws, those that specifically target vested
rights are purportedly illegitimate, as well. As put by E.S. Corwin in “The Dred Scott
Decision, in the Light of Contemporary Legal Doctrines:”
The doctrine of "vested rights" signified this: that property rights were sacred by
the law of nature and the social compact, that any legislative enactment affecting
such rights was always to be judged of from the point of view of their operation
upon such rights, and that when an enactment affected such rights detrimentally
without making compensation to the owner, it was to be viewed as inflicting upon
such owner a penalty ex post facto and therefore as void. 109
This understanding will have particularly profound consequences in the Dred Scott case.
And, interestingly, it was not Justice Taney’s understanding of the vested rights doctrine
that was viewed as problematic at the time, but his proclamation that black persons could
not be regarded as citizens.
Williams argues that the second “General Law” strand of due process
jurisprudence developed in the 19th century assumed that all citizens live under “general”
and “impartial” laws.110 Therefore, designated individuals or classes cannot be relegated
to hierarchical classes or provided special privileges. This is, according to Williams, what
Daniel Webster was referring to in his famous Trustees of Dartmouth College v.
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Woodward (1819) speech.111 In this way, the “general law” cases appear to reflect the
principles enunciated in the Equal Protection Clause.
Thus, an understanding of vested rights that strictly prohibits ex-post facto laws as
well as the general law philosophy hardly reflect the same substantive due process
doctrine adopted in the Lochner line of cases or in those articulating a constitutional right
to privacy, dignity, etc. In fact, these strands (at least as described here) of due process
arguably could be better characterized as procedural in nature. The proposition that an
individual may not be deprived of life, liberty, or property by a subsequent act of the
legislature could be formulated in traditional due process terms. Professor Harrison
formulates the argument as follows:
Suppose we assume, for separation of powers reasons, that only judicial power
may affect a direct deprivation of life, liberty, or property. Assume further that
each branch must use the procedures appropriate to it, a conclusion I say results
from a natural reading of the Due Process Clauses. It would follow that all direct
deprivations must be effected through judicial procedures, and hence through the
application of pre-existing law.112
However, as I will argue, the kind of “vested rights” doctrine that Justice Taney employs
takes on a much more “substantive” form.
Furthermore, the notion that citizens must be regulated by “impartial” laws, too, is
sharply distinguishable from what we know as substantive due process jurisprudence
today. Rather, it would appear that this line of cases reflects some notion that individuals
in like circumstances should be treated similarly (equal protection) and that if those
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similarly situated are treated differently, there is some deficiency in process (procedural
due process).
Thus, neither the plain language of the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendment Due
Process Clauses nor an examination of what was meant by “due process” at the time
these amendments were enacted would appear to support today’s substantive due process
jurisprudence. But is that the end of the discussion or is it necessary to go further—to
treat the Constitution as a living document whose meaning legitimately extends beyond
its plain language and the authors’ intent?

Section Summation
As argued throughout this section, on their faces, the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments do not support the assertion that the judiciary is given constitutional license
to adjudicate on the grounds of natural rights. The Ninth Amendment, however, affords
both textualists and various sects of originalism a reasonable path towards its
understanding. Regardless of whether one finds natural rights jurisprudence
constitutionally legitimate, however, its politicizing effects on the federal judiciary
generally (as well as the Supreme Court specifically) are more clear and profound. The
following section is devoted to a historical review of this phenomenon, as well as how the
doctrine of substantive due process has evolved over the course of the American
judiciary.
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Section Three: The Politicizing Role of Substantive Due Process in
American Jurisprudence
Dred Scott v. Sandford (1957): The Original Substantive Due Process Case?
Today, substantive due process is hailed by liberals as an essential judicial check
on governmental infringements of the American peoples’ intrinsic human rights. From
abortion to sexual sodomy to a plethora of other “private” acts, courts have repeatedly
used the doctrine over the past six decades to stifle governmental intrusion into the lives
of its citizens. These decisions, explicitly or implicitly, often rest on judicial
identification and interpretation of natural or unenumerated rights.
With that being said, one of the (if not the) most infamous and universally
denounced Supreme Court decisions rested, at least in part, on the Court’s understanding
of the substantive (property) rights ostensibly protected by the Fifth Amendment’s Due
Process Clause—an understanding with implications for basic human rights that would
be an anathema to today’s proponents of substantive due process. Indeed, according to
Evan Bernick, former Assistant Director of the Center for Judicial Engagement at the
Institute for Justice, “perhaps nothing has damaged the reputation of the doctrine more
than [its] association with Dred Scott v. Sandford.”113 For this reason, the decision holds
particular relevance for this thesis.
However, Dred Scott was almost as complex with respect to due process as it was
legally unsound. To some, the decision rested on the Court’s understanding of natural
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rights—to others, it relied on some notion of “vested” property rights, and still to others,
on a commitment to “resolve” the issue of slavery in the Territories, once and for all,
without regard to established jurisprudence. As such, scholars of equally impressive
pedigree have disagreed vehemently over how, exactly, the Court understood the Fifth
Amendment’s Due Process Clause.
And, while the conceptual underpinnings of the Court’s decision are up for
debate, its history as well as direct implications for Dred Scott are not. Dred Scott and his
family had been taken by their owners through both slave and free states as well as the
Territories during the course of a number of years’ sojourn. 114 After two unsuccessful
attempts to gain his freedom through state court actions, Scott sued in the federal court
system in Missouri. 115 At the time the action was filed, Dred Scott and his family resided
in Missouri, while his purported “owner” resided outside the state. 116
As a direct consequence of the Supreme Court’s ruling, Dred Scott was to remain
a slave. Furthermore, the Court declared that blacks could not be—nor, as an entire race,
were they ever intended to be—citizens of the United States with right to sue in federal
court.117 Lastly, the Court went on in dicta to state that despite the proclamation in
Section II, Clause II of Article IV that “The Congress shall have power to dispose of and
make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property
belonging to the United States,” 118 the federal government had no legitimate
constitutional authority to regulate slavery in the Territories, thereby voiding the Missouri
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Compromise. From both a moral and legal perspective, the Dred Scott ruling has been
resolutely denounced across the board.
Both on the issue of standing and on the legality of the Missouri Compromise,
Chief Justice Taney, who authored the (7-2) majority decision, had to engage in an
extraordinarily convoluted exercise in judicial gymnastics. In declaring that Dred Scott
lacked standing to bring his case for freedom in the federal court system, the Supreme
Court both explicitly and implicitly leaped over several remarkable hurdles. Specifically,
Chief Justice Taney:
● Ignored the failure of the Defendant to raise an objection to Dred Scott’s standing
in the lower courts;
● Created a novel distinction between state and US citizenship;
● Established an “exception” for blacks who could vote in five of the thirteen states
and who were considered citizens of both the nation and their respective states
when the Constitution was ratified
● Distinguished prior Congressional grants of freedom to blacks residing in other
US territories.119
Perhaps the most notorious aspect of Chief Justice Taney’s ruling, of course, is his
proclamation that the principles enunciated in the Declaration of Independence were
never meant to apply to the black race:
[Negroes were] beings of an inferior order, and altogether unfit to associate with
the white race, either in social or political relations; and so far inferior, that they
had no rights which the white man was bound to respect. 120
To allow slavery in a society where all men are deemed to be created equal would mean
that the Framers themselves were hypocrites. It would imply that our forefathers were
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“utterly and flagrantly inconsistent with the principles they asserted.” 121 The only way the
Framers could have accepted the notion of slavery while simultaneously and without
hypocrisy hold that conviction that all men are created equal would be to categorically
exclude slaves from the citizenry. And being excluded from the citizenry, slaves—and
their descendants—were necessarily precluded from access to the federal court system.
Interestingly, then, despite abundant evidence to the contrary, Chief Justice Taney could
have ended the case simply by concluding that the descendants of black slaves could not
be American citizens.
However, the Court’s decision went much further in scope and legal
interpretation. At least in part, it did so in the name of the Fifth Amendment’s Due
Process Clause. As society’s conception of what constitutes an inalienable privilege
evolves with the times, hindsight affords us an all-too-clear mirror for us to examine of
our errors. This is perhaps most evident from Justice Taney’s Dred Scott v. Sandford
(1957) decision:
Thus, the rights of property are united with the rights of person, and placed
on the same ground by the fifth amendment to the Constitution, which provides
that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, and property, without due process
of law…. [A]n Act of Congress which deprives a citizen of the United States of
his liberty or property, merely because he came himself or brought his
property into a particular Territory of the United States, and who had
committed no offense against the laws, could hardly be dignified with the
name of due process of law…. And if the Constitution recognizes the right of
property of the master in a slave, and makes no distinction between that
description of property and other property owned by a citizen, no tribunal,
acting under the authority of the United States, whether it be legislative,
executive, or judicial, has a right to draw such a distinction, or deny to it the
benefit of the provisions and guarantees which have been provided for the
protection of private property against the encroachments of the Government. 122
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It is primarily this language that is cited by those who tie the notion of substantive due
process to the Dred Scott case. According to scholars such as Robert Bork and the late
David P. Currie, the decision “was at least very possibly the first application of
substantive due process in the Supreme Court, the original precedent for Lochner v. New
York and Roe v. Wade.”123 Indeed, while the passage above explicitly referred to the Fifth
Amendment’s Due Process Clause, it is abundantly clear that the type of due process was
not “procedural.” Indeed, the means by which the Missouri Compromise (or any other
federal act) was passed was irrelevant. For this reason, the ruling clearly enunciated a
substantive component to the Due Process Clause.
Whether or not the Dred Scott case was truly a substantive due process decision
as that term is understood in modern jurisprudence, however, is not so simple a question.
Certainly the Court did not go beyond the language of the Constitution in the same way
necessary to find a constitutional right to “privacy.” Nor did the decision suggest or
imply that the right to hold property—in the form of slaves—was so inherent or
fundamental that it could never be curtailed by governmental action: After all, the
Northern states did not authorize or condone slavery.
How, exactly, the substantive nature of Justice Taney’s reading should be (or was)
understood at the time the decision was issued may very well differ from today’s notion
of the doctrine. With that being said, one could be forgiven for reading Justice Taney’s
decision as stating: 1) The Constitution grants white men a right (a substantive right) to
property; 2) the Constitution makes no distinction between the ownership of slaves and
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other forms of property; 3) Congress is legally precluded from depriving white men of
their slave property in the Territories. However, if this were truly the case, and the right
to own slaves were both natural and absolute, it would seem to imply that no government
body would have the authority to ban slavery anywhere. While it might be possible to
logically draw such a conclusion from various excerpts of the decision, this most
certainly is not how the outcome was understood.
Thus, while it might be more compelling for my overall thesis, the argument is
not so black and white. Rather than resting on a pure notion of “natural” rights, it may be
that the conceptual underpinning of the decision related to a particular notion of property
rights that was well established when the case was decided. As argued by Edward S.
Corwin in “The Dred Scott Decision, in the light of Contemporary Legal Doctrines”:
What Taney was attempting to do...was to engraft the doctrine of "vested rights "
upon the national constitution as a limitation upon national power by casting
round it the "due process of law" clause of the Fifth Amendment. But neither the
doctrine of "vested rights" nor yet such use of "due process of law" was novel,
and indeed, in 1857, the former was comparatively ancient. The doctrine of
“vested rights” signified this: That property rights were sacred by the law of
nature….124
Thus, those who give weight to the widely spread recognition of “vested rights” must
also note that, in a sense, it had a natural rights foundation. To others, though, Chief
Justice Taney’s argument was less “natural” and simply implied that “when slaveholders
moved their property from slave jurisdictions to free territories, they could not lose their
rights in their slaves; otherwise the federal government would have destroyed their vested
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property rights (and given them to the slave), thus taking from A and giving to B.” 125 In
this manner, Professors Balkin and Levinson view the doctrine used in Dred Scott very
differently than how it is applied today.
Meanwhile, other commentators such as Bernick agree that Dred Scott was, in
fact, a substantive due process case—albeit one that was wrongly decided—and, in
support of this view, cites Justice Benjamin R. Curtis’ dissenting opinion. According to
Bernick, Justice Curtis—like the majority—accepted the notion of natural rights, but
rather associated them with blacks’ right to freedom rather than the whites’ right to
property. Specifically, Curtis stated: “Slavery, being contrary to natural right, is created
only by municipal law.”126 Unfortunately for Bernick, while Justice Curtis did indeed
dissent from the majority, his assertion that “slavery is contrary to natural right” was not
meant to imply that it was always illegal. Indeed, he explicitly stated that the institution
may be created by positive law. This understanding was also pronounced by Justice
McLean:
What gives the master the right to control the will of his slave? The local law,
which exists in some form. But where there is no such law, can the master
control the will of the slave by force… By virtue of what law is it, that a master
may take his slave into free territory, and exact him the duties of a slave? The law
of the Territory does not sanction it. No authority can be claimed under the
Constitution of the United States, or any law of Congress. Will it be said that the
slave is taken as property, the same as other property which the master may own?
To this I answer, that colored persons are made property by the law of the
State, and no such power has been given to Congress…127
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Meanwhile, the doctrine of substantive due process means precisely that positive, duly
passed public policy may be overridden by the court system in the name of natural or
unenumerated rights. Thus, to suggest that since the dissenting justices believed slavery
was contrary to natural right implied that it could be prohibited over positive law is
unfounded.
In short, legal scholars can be found on both sides of the debate about whether or
not Dred Scott was a substantive due process case in the vested rights tradition, whether it
rested on some natural rights concept, or whether it was virtually devoid of the doctrine
entirely. Often, those opposing the concept of substantive due process attempt to
associate the case more closely with the philosophy, and those in favor of its broader,
modern application deny its connection.
The discussion is not helped by the fact that the complex structure and
meandering style employed by Chief Justice Taney complicates the job of following the
case entirely. Insofar as Taney appears to be committed to providing a determinative
“answer” to the question of slavery in the Territories, his decision indeed has something
of a “kitchen sink” quality: Any rationale, ideology, historical distortion, or intellectual
somersault that could be used (including, but not limited to, references to the Fifth
Amendment’s Due Process Clause) was fair game so long as it supported the Justice’s
pre-ordained conclusion.
Under these circumstances, it is fair to say that some notion of what we might
today call a “substantive” right to property appears to be one of several factors in the
decision. While Chief Justice Taney only referred to the Due Process Clause once (and in
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passing), the basic concept underlying today’s substantive due process concept was
articulated elsewhere in the decision:
The powers of the Government, and the rights of the citizen under it, are positive
and practical regulations plainly written down. The people of the United States
have delegated to it certain enumerated powers, and forbidden it to exercise
others. It has no power over the person or property of a citizen but what the
citizens of the United States have granted. And no laws or usages of other
nations, or reasoning of statesmen or jurists upon the relations of master and
slave, can enlarge the powers of the Government, or take from the citizens the
rights they have reserved. 128
Indeed, the reference to the Constitution as one that delegated strictly enumerated powers
evokes an understanding of the Ninth and Tenth Amendments outlined in the previous
section. However, an equally strong case can be made that, ironically enough, the
conceptual underpinning of Dred Scott (to the extent one finds one) was a substantive
notion of “equal protection” of various forms of property. The Court stated:

Now, as we have already said in an earlier part of this opinion, upon a different
point, the right of property in a slave is distinctly and expressly affirmed in the
Constitution. The right to traffic in it, like an ordinary article of merchandise and
property, was guaranteed to the citizens of the United States, in every State that
might desire it, for twenty years. . . And no word can be found in the
Constitution which gives Congress a greater power over slave property, or
which entitles property of that kind to less protection that property of any
other description. The only power conferred is the power coupled with the duty
of guarding and protecting the owner in his rights. 129
The dissent of Justice Curtis likewise characterized the majority’s decision as one that
rested on some notion of “equal protection” of different forms of property. He described
the majority decision as one that:
[i]s said to rest upon the equal right of all citizens to go with their property upon
the public domain, and the inequality of a regulation which would admit the
128
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property of some and exclude the property of other citizens; and, inasmuch as
slaves are chiefly held by citizens of those particular States where slavery is
established, it is insisted that a regulation excluding slavery from a Territory
operates, practically, to make an unjust discrimination between citizens of
different States, in respect to their use and enjoyment of the territory of the
United States130
This “general law” understanding of substantive due process was thus applied to property
rather than the individual rights of people to be treated equally before the law. In this
manner, the Court blithely ignored the rather obvious fact that the respective states
could—and were always intended to have—diverse public policies related to various
forms of property, including slavery. Indeed, if Chief Justice Taney’s logic were applied
today, those who obtained marijuana in states where its recreational possession and use
was legal could carry it into states where it is strictly prohibited. Of course, such an
interpretation cannot be reasonably inferred from the text of the Fifth Amendment (or the
Fourteenth, for that matter).
Regardless, it appears that rather than purely asserting a property right of the
individual against the power of the federal government, the Taney Court relied on a
modified version of “vested” or “general law” substantive due process that had already
been acknowledged as legitimate by the legal community. Of course, its acceptance does
not necessarily make it permissible or totally void from a connection to natural law
jurisprudence. Furthermore, while Taney did not directly go so far as to propose an
absolute right to slave ownership, his understanding of “vested rights,” some conception
of arbitrariness, and the Fifth Amendment is nonetheless a preeminent (and particularly
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glaring) example of how justices may manipulate or ignore evidence more easily with the
substantive due process doctrine.
It is clear that when discussing due process, Chief Justice Taney’s decision did
not refer to the manner by which the Missouri Compromise denied slaveholders of their
property rights. For this reason, those who claim that the opinion had no substantive due
process component are on unsteady footing. Furthermore, it’s difficult to reconcile
whether his understanding of substantive due process was exclusively in the “vested
rights” tradition in light of his assertion that the “rights of property are united with the
rights of person.” Indeed, it seems that the Court ruled against Scott because there was
some unconscionable notion of arbitrariness in a certain property right being taken away
based on one’s location. In this manner, Chief Justice Taney blended traditional
conceptions of “vested” property rights with a more modern notion—that the Court has
the authority to substitute its judgment for that of Congress with regard to what
deprivations of property are justified.

The Dred Scott Case and the Politicization of the Supreme Court
Impassioned political leaders, newspapers, and members of the general public in
both the North and the South reacted to the Dred Scott decision with unrelenting fervor. It
is clear from a variety of sources that the outcome of the case itself was (at least in the
North) regarded not only as poor legal interpretation, but as judicial activism. As such, in
addition to providing modern scholars a focus point for spirited debate over the history
and evolution of substantive due process, the case also represents one of the most highly
political decisions in American constitutional history.
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As previously outlined, the working definition for this thesis assesses the degree
of politicization of the Supreme Court using five interrelated factors:
● The degree to which the Court makes controversial decisions that are important to
the public and inconsistent with the strongly held views of a not insubstantial
sector of the public, based on a rationale that is obscure.
● The extent to which the Supreme Court deviates (or appears to deviate) from
established precedent or modes of judicial interpretation to reach a particular
result in cases that have broad political implications.
● The extent to which Supreme Court composition is the focus of political
processes, including election rhetoric and voting priorities.
● The extent to which Supreme Court nomination and confirmation is subject to a
political litmus test, especially at the expense of judicial qualifications and
expertise.
● The degree to which Supreme Court justices are polarized along the legal
spectrum.
By these criteria, the Dred Scott case was among the most political—and among the most
politicizing—decisions ever rendered by the Supreme Court.
With respect to the first two criteria, it is abundantly clear from the dissents filed
by Justices Curtis and McLean that the decision deviated from precedent in several ways.
As already mentioned, while the “vested rights” doctrine had been applied previously, its
use here was groundbreaking in its scope. Additionally, the conclusion itself that
Congress could not regulate slavery in the Territories was, of course, extraordinary. The
notion had not been seriously contested from a legal standpoint since the Missouri
Compromise, and, given that the Constitution explicitly addressed congressional
regulation of the slave trade, it would be odd indeed for the body to have no authority
over the issue in the Territories. Meanwhile, the political implications of the case were as
broad and pervasive as any in the Court’s history.
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Additionally, the repercussions on political processes and events were profound.
The case had extraordinary political and economic consequences, and was a major
contributing factor in laying the immediate groundwork for (or, at the very least,
expediting the timeline of) the Civil War. 131 The formation of the Republican Party and
ultimate election of Abraham Lincoln was in large part attributable to the North’s
reaction to the decision and its implications with respect to the spread of slavery in the
Territories.132 Meanwhile, while the South hailed the decision as a vindication of its most
cherished institution. Furthermore, according to the historian Paul Finkelman, Abraham
Lincoln believed Dred Scott was “the first step in a Democratic conspiracy to nationalize
slavery.”133
The dicta in Dred Scott suggested that Congress had no power to preclude the
expansion of slavery into the Territories, thereby upsetting the precarious political
compromise in the Kansas-Nebraska Act that had until that time staved off a showdown.
Under the reasoning of the case, the North would lose political power, since it was
anticipated that many of the new states admitted would be slave states. Additionally, each
slave would be counted towards the southern states’ populations as three-fifths of a
person, thereby increasing the slave holding states' seats in the House of Representatives.
Additionally, historians now believe that President Buchanan knew the result of
the Dred Scott decision before the resolution of the case.134 During his inauguration,
President-elect Buchanan declared that expansion of slavery into the territories was a
131
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“judicial question” and that he would “cheerfully submit” to the outcome. 135 However,
Justice Grier had informed President Buchanan about the inner-workings of the Court. 136
Thus, Finkelman argues, “the Court and the President-elect worked closely to get the
decision Buchanan and Taney wanted and to get the nation to accept it.” 137
Perhaps unsurprisingly, few newspaper articles in the South thoroughly examined
the constitutional legitimacy of the decision.138 As the following sections will show, it is
far less likely for the winners of substantive due process cases to dwell on the
constitutional merits of various cases than losers. This may be because the thrill of major
victory overshadows the desire to examine the technical arguments that pervade in the
courtroom. However, as I see it, it is because often times the legal grounds are
extraordinarily difficult to defend.
Indeed, rather than exploring the legal rationale for its victory, publications from
the Mercury paper in Charleston, South Carolina to the Richmond Inquirer lauded the
decision as vindication of the traditions, laws, and culture of the southern people. 139
Interestingly, the South also published far fewer reactions to the case than the North—
often merely citing a restatement of the facts or the implications of the decision itself. 140
That the Supreme Court lost legitimacy in the eyes of northern states, however, is
beyond dispute. Rather than an exercise of clearly defined law, northerners regarded the

135

Ibid., 45.
Ibid., 46.
137
Ibid. 47.
138
Alix Oswald, "The Reaction to the Dred Scott Decision," Chapman University Historical Review, 1st
ser., 4 (2012): 177, https://journals.chapman.edu/ojs/index.php/VocesNovae/article/view/328/704.
139
Ibid., 175-177.
140
Ibid., 178.
136

61

Court’s decision as the majority’s flagrant attempt to solve the “slavery question” once
and for all. One article in the Chicago Daily Tribune declared:
Since the organization of the government, no event has occurred that will entail
upon the country the consequences, which are involved in this partisan movement
of the slavery propagandists. It is the first step in a revolution which, if not
arrested, nullifies the Revolution of '76 and makes us all slaves again. 141
Another article continued:
It is in vain that we may look for power in the Constitution to establish Slavery
anywhere. The Constitution is the charter of our Freedom, and in every sense the
blackest, poorest or meanest man, except he be convicted of crime, is entitled to
the fullest protection of 'Life, Liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. 142
And, as noted previously, historians largely agree that instead of calming the intensity of
the slavery debate, the Dred Scott decision exacerbated the hostility that culminated in
the Civil War.143 As such, the case marks a major turning point in both American legal
and political history.
It may be properly argued that Chief Justice Taney and his Court would have
found Dred Scott—and all black persons—ineligible for citizenship regardless of the
doctrine employed. Indeed, judicial activism cannot be said to have begun with
substantive due process. However, as the remainder of the historical analysis will show,
wide-ranging authority to adjudicate along the grounds of “arbitrariness,” “justice,”
“dignity,” or “privacy” opens doors for the Court to accomplish public policy goals that
would otherwise be more difficult to defend. Indeed, before such a doctrine was
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available, judges were forced to legislate the “old-fashioned” way: They lied about it.144
To be sure, then, bad legal interpretation and judicial activism can find a foothold in other
constitutional provisions and using other conceptual underpinnings. However, as the
remaining case studies seek to demonstrate, the doctrine of substantive due process
leaves adjudicative bodies particularly vulnerable to politicization.
Perhaps it is largely for this reason that, in his dissent, Justice McLean regarded
the decision as “more a matter of taste than of law.” 145 Furthermore, Justice Benjamin
Curtis resigned from the Supreme Court largely due to controversy and dispute
surrounding the Dred Scott decision.146 Thus, the final criteria for politicization
outlined—the degree of polarization among justices themselves—is clearly met in the
current case.

The Lochner Era and Liberty of Contract
The Slaughter-House Cases (1873) set the precedent that the Due Process and
Privileges and Immunities Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment did not have a
substantive or “natural rights” component. 147 This changed in Allgeyer v. Louisiana
(1897), which was the first case to elucidate a “liberty of contract” inherent in the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Of course, since the clause addresses
states and not the federal government, this decision also marked one of the first times the
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Supreme Court applied natural or “unenumerated” rights jurisprudence to state
legislation.
The Louisiana statute in question prohibited companies from contracting with
marine insurance firms that had not “complied in all respects with the laws of [the]
State.”148 Since regulatory hurdles made it difficult for out-of-state insurance firms to
legally contract with in-state companies, the state effectively steered the marine insurance
market to those firms that operated within the state. When Allgeyer & Co sought to
insure a shipment of cotton through Atlantic Mutual Insurance Company, which was
based in New York City, the state filed suit. 149
Writing for a unanimous Court, Justice Rufus Wheeler Peckham declared the
following:
The "liberty" mentioned… means the right of the citizen to be free in the
enjoyment of all his faculties, to be free to use them in all lawful ways, to live
and work where he will, to earn his livelihood by any lawful calling, to
pursue any livelihood or avocation, and for that purpose to enter into all
contracts which may be proper, necessary, and essential to his carrying out to a
successful conclusion the purposes above mentioned… [We] do not intend to hold
that in no such case can the state exercise its police power. When and how far
such power may be legitimately exercised with regard to these subjects must
be left for determination to each case as it arises…..To deprive the citizen of
such a right as herein described without due process of law is illegal. Such a
statute as this in question is not due process of law, because it prohibits an act
which under the federal Constitution the defendants had a right to perform. 150
Justice Peckham, perhaps the most adamant supporter of economic substantive due
process, narrowly tailored his decision to the case at hand while altogether speaking in
circles. Indeed, in terms of its level of obfuscation, Justice Peckham’s writing is eerily
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similar to that of Chief Justice Taney. In short, he appears to state that the regulation
violates the Due Process Clause because it cannot be “dignified” as due process of law.
In this case, Allegeyer’s purported liberty interest outweighed those of the state.
However, the scope and nature of the substantive due process doctrine were not properly
defined by the Court. Indeed, as we shall see, establishing general rules and interpretive
frameworks for substantive due process becomes increasingly difficult with its evolution.
Perhaps this is because the doctrine is, by its nature, tied to “living Constitution” theory.
How, after all, can even a rudimentary code of analysis be formulated and maintained if a
doctrine’s limits are, by definition, allowed to evolve with social norms?
Nonetheless, even at this preliminary stage, the battleground was set for the
foundational battle that would pervade the substantive due process debate over the next
four decades. The notion of economic substantive due process had its genesis in the clash
between the state government’s police power and an individual or corporation’s liberty to
pursue a trade, engage in an activity, or otherwise further its business interest. In this era,
the Court took on the responsibility of weighing “natural” or “American” liberties against
the state’s ends (often to protect workers or promote an economic policy). In doing so,
often with heavy, longstanding ties to the business community, the federal judiciary
overturned state legislation aimed at furthering the public good.

Lochner v. New York (1905)
When examined through this lens, it is clear how the Allgeyer case paved the way
for Lochner v. New York (1905), which appropriately gave the era of economic
substantive due process its name. The state law in dispute prohibited owners of bakeries
from allowing their employees to work more than 60 hours a week or 10 hours in a
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day.151 After repeatedly violating the statute, Joseph Lochner, the owner of a small
bakeshop, filed suit. Once appealing and losing his case in the state’s highest court, he
was granted a writ of certiorari to bring his case before the Supreme Court. Delivering the
opinion of the Court, Justice Rufus Peckham again underscored the newly fashioned
“realm” protected by the Due Process Clause:
The general right to make a contract in relation to his business is part of the
liberty of the individual protected by the Fourteenth Amendment of the Federal
Constitution…. The right to purchase or to sell labor is part of the liberty
protected by this amendment unless there are circumstances which exclude the
right.152
The State of New York rested its case on the assertion that, at the time, bakers faced
particularly adverse working conditions. According to Professor Hirt in his treatise on the
Diseases of the Workers:
The constant inhaling of flour dust causes inflammation of the lungs and of the
bronchial tubes. The eyes also suffer through this dust, which is responsible for
the many cases of running eyes among the bakers. The long hours of toil to which
all bakers are subjected produce rheumatism, cramps and swollen legs. The
intense heat in the workshops induces the workers to resort to cooling drinks,
which, together with their habit of exposing the greater part of their bodies to the
change in the atmosphere, is another source of a number of diseases of various
organs.153
Despite evidence from health experts indicating the benefit of limiting bakers’ working
hours to 60 hours per week (or ten per day), the Court overturned New York’s law,
holding that it did not fall within the jurisdiction’s legitimate police powers. Instead, the
majority found that the state’s health concerns were invalid. Therefore, since there was
no “material danger to the public health or health of the employees,” it was declared that:
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the individuals whose rights are thus made the subject of legislative interference
are under the protection of the Federal Constitution regarding their liberty of
contract as well as of person, and the legislature of the State has no power to limit
their right as proposed in this statute. 154
In this manner, the Court enunciated a substantive element to the Fourteenth
Amendment’s Due Process Clause.
Interestingly, perhaps the clearest evidence that the Lochner decision’s
substantive due process basis politicized the Supreme Court is found in the dissenting
opinions. Joined by Justices White and Day, Justice Harlan scribed one of the most
famous dissents in American constitutional history—an opinion that admitted there may
be a valid “liberty of contract” concept embedded in the Fourteenth Amendment, but
found that this right was not absolute:
I take it to be firmly established that what is called the liberty of contract may,
within certain limits, be subjected to regulations designed and calculated to
promote the general welfare or to guard the public health, the public morals or the
public safety.155
Thus, rather than negating the validity of the substantive due process doctrine entirely,
Justice Harlan merely disagreed on its scope, and whether it was exceeded in this
particular case. In support of his assertion, he cited Jacobson v. Massachusetts (1905):
The liberty secured by the Constitution of the United States to every person
within its jurisdiction does not import… an absolute right in each person to be, at
all times and in all circumstances, wholly freed from restraint. 156
In this manner, Justice Harlan’s decision appears to be more about deference to the
legislative realm than a rejection of the liberty of contract concept. Unless a public policy
measure duly enacted by the states and aimed at furthering the public interest in some
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meaningful way was “plainly, palpably” and “beyond all question” inconsistent with the
Constitution of the United States, Justice Harlan argued, the Court should presume goodfaith on the part of the legislative body. 157 Only as a consequence of the Court’s error in
refraining from deference, then, did the dissent find fault with the majority’s decision. In
this regard, the Court improperly resolved matters:
which have been supposed to belong exclusively to the legislative departments of
the several States exerting their conceded power to guard the health and safety of
their citizens by such regulations as they in their wisdom deem best. 158
As a result, Justice Harlan somewhat narrowly tailored his critique while simultaneously
asserting that the precedent set may “seriously cripple the inherent power of the States.”
While Justice John Marshall Harlan’s is potentially the more famous of the two,
Justice Holmes’ dissent was an equally (if not more) scathing rebuke of the 5-4
majority’s opinion:
This case is decided upon an economic theory which a large part of the country
does not entertain. If it were a question whether I agreed with that theory, I should
desire to study it further and long before making up my mind. But I do not
conceive that to be my duty, because I strongly believe that my agreement or
disagreement has nothing to do with the right of a majority to embody their
opinions in law. It is settled by various decisions of this court that state
constitutions and state laws may regulate life in many ways which we, as
legislators, might think as injudicious, or, if you like, as tyrannical, as this, and
which, equally with this, interfere with the liberty to contract...a constitution is not
intended to embody a particular economic theory, whether of paternalism and the
organic relation of the citizen to the State or of laissez faire…. It is made for
people of fundamentally differing views, and the accident of our finding certain
opinions natural and familiar or novel and even shocking ought not to conclude
our judgment upon the question whether statutes embodying them conflict with
the Constitution of the United States…. I think that the word liberty in the
Fourteenth Amendment is perverted when it is held to prevent the natural
outcome of a dominant opinion, unless it can be said that a rational and fair
man necessarily would admit that the statute proposed would infringe
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fundamental principles as they have been understood by the traditions of our
people and our law.159
The short, decisively written dissent struck to the very heart of the matter. Interestingly,
though, even Justice Holmes admitted in his last paragraph that the Fourteenth
Amendment may allow for some form of natural law jurisprudence. However, if
anything, his incisive dissent underscored the great problem of substantive due process:
Many rational and fair men may reasonably disagree on what constitutes “fundamental
principles” or the “traditions of our people.” Unless Justice Holmes was willing to accuse
his colleagues of purposefully distorting the Constitution to accomplish political ends, he
must have assumed that they honestly believed the liberty of contract theory to be a
“fundamental principle” that was embedded in the “traditions of our people.” And while
he may, in fact, have been accusing his fellow justices of outright, intentionally
unfounded judicial activism, this is far from clear. Rather, his colleagues may have
simply had a different perception of what constituted a natural right.
American scholarly and legal disapproval of the Lochner decision and its
aftermath is well documented and extensive. In fact, according to Professor Amar Akhil
at Yale Law School:
the very word “Lochner” is for legal insiders synonymous with judicial overreach.
Lochner is thus not just a case, but an era and an attitude. In legal discourse it has
even become a verb. To “Lochner” or to “Lochnerize” is to commit the same kind
of judicial sin that characterized many of the Court’s rulings in what is now
known as “the Lochner era” — roughly the mid-1880s through the mid-1930s —
in which the Court without clear textual warrant struck down a multitude of
reasonable reform statutes regulating free-market excesses160
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In fact, the nearly universal denunciation of the Lochner case and its progeny has had
repercussions for constitutional drafting and legal interpretation across the globe. For
example, Pierre Trudeau was well aware of the use of the substantive due process to
strike down minimum wage, child labor, and work hour legislation, 161 and took steps to
insulate Canada’s Charter from the effects of the doctrine. In front of the Special Joint
Committee of the Senate and the House of Commons on the Constitution in 1970, Barry
Strayer, who was responsible for drafting Canada’s 1969 constitutional proposals, noted
that due process created problems under the American Constitution in relation to liberty
and property, stating: “It has been used by the courts to strike down legislation which the
majority of Americans apparently regard as being socially desirable.” 162 Ultimately, in
order to avoid the possibility of the Canadian court system adopting some form of
economic substantive due process, he included a Due Process Clause in his draft which
omitted the protection of property in place of “security of person.” 163
While recent attempts have been made by economic libertarian scholars such as
David Bernstein and others to “rehabilitate” Lochner, the majority of legal scholars
continue to hold the view of legal philosopher Ronald Dworkin, who observed that
Lochner is the “whipping boy” of American constitutional law. 164

Lochner’s Politicizing Effects
Given that Lochner is still widely deemed to be synonymous with judicial
activism, it is somewhat hard to imagine how the decision would not politicize the
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Supreme Court. Indeed, if one wanted to turn the Court into an effective policy-making
body, “judicial activism” would be the way to go. However, it is worthwhile to assess
Lochner through more structured framework for measuring politicization.
First, though, it is impossible to address the political nature of the Lochner
decision and its aftermath without thoroughly examining the Court’s connection to the
industrial titans (as well as the laissez-faire philosophy) that dominated the day. Indeed,
Justice Peckham was a close friend and advisor to a variety of business leaders including
John Rockefeller, John Pierpont Morgan, Sr., and Cornelius Vanderbilt. 165 When not in
public service, Peckham often served as their legal counsel, and he also had close
connections with fellow members of the Board of Trustees for the Mutual Life Insurance
Company of New York. 166 And, while it should be duly noted that Peckham often voted
to break up large businesses in antitrust cases,167 his personal life nonetheless explains his
largely pro-business judicial leanings.
In fact, it is no coincidence that the Supreme Court, and the legal profession
generally, maintained a firm commitment to the liberty of contract doctrine. According to
the Oxford scholar Edward Corwin, the American Bar Association (founded in 1878):
became a sort of juristic sewing circle for mutual education in the gospel of
laissez faire… The country was presented with a new, up-to-date version of
natural law… The guarantees which the Constitution affords private rights were
intended to supply, above all other things, a legal and political sanction to the
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laws of political economy and to the process of evolution as forecast by Herbert
Spencer.168
In stark contrast with the revival of substantive due process in the 1960s, the Lochner era
reflected judicial activism with a conservative, capitalistic bent. According to John P.
Frank: the “new bench was chosen from a bar which had imbedded that part of the
truncated philosophy of laissez-faire which became popular among lawyers for enterprise
in the last half of the nineteenth century.” 169 Thus, particularly among affluent, educated
circles, almost religious-like credence was regularly given to capitalistic, anti-regulation,
and union-busting policies.
It is with this background that the previously expounded factors concerning
Lochner’s politicizing effects will be analyzed. First, it appears clear that the Lochner
decision and its progeny constituted controversial decisions that were important to the
public and inconsistent with the strongly held views of a not insubstantial sector of the
public, and these decisions were based on a rationale that is obscure. It is readily apparent
from the dissenting opinion written by Justice Holmes that the Lochner case was decided
based on an economic view that a large swath of the country “did not entertain.” The
obscurity of the doctrine, too, is evident from the fact that the Court consistently chose to
evaluate its limits on a case-by-case basis. Rather than clearly defining what, precisely,
was within its grounds, the Court simply decided to pick and choose what legislation it
would find sufficiently obtrusive to its notion of “liberty.”
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The second factor relates to the extent to which the Supreme Court deviates (or
appears to deviate) from established norms to reach a particular result in cases that have
broad political implications. Here, too, it appears that the Lochner approach registered as
highly political: While the stage was set for liberty of contract jurisprudence in Allgeyer,
the doctrine was both novel and relatively obscure. Additionally, the Lochner approach to
economic legislation certainly had broad political implications: As Justice Harlan
observed, the failure of the Court to defer to legislative bodies in these matters would
deprive them of their legitimate police powers, which could “cripple” their ability to
perform the basic functions of a modern state. Finally, with respect to the fifth and final
factor—the degree to which Supreme Court justices are polarized along the legal
spectrum—the extent of politicization is also evident from Holmes’ dissent, which was
one of the most accusatory of judicial activism in the Court’s history. The third and
fourth factors—the extent to which Supreme Court composition is the focus of political
processes, including election rhetoric, voting processes, and Supreme Court
nominations—requires further discussion.
The high regard for property rights (and, by extension, the notion that liberty of
contract was fundamental) among elites and the dissenting view of the growing industrial
underclass meant that the Lochner opinion received mixed responses from various areas
of the country. The Los Angeles Times, New York Times, New York Herald, and Dallas
Morning News, for example, all supported the outcome, with some publications declaring
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it a victory for the “sacred rights of the freeman” and a much-needed prospective blow to
the strike to the tyranny of socialist rule. 170
Of course, others were more hostile to the decision. Shortly after its release, The
Baker’s Journal declared that Lochner was “the hardest blow ever dealt by the courts of
this country to organized labor”171 and later issued an article asserting the following;
[t]he bakery workers die like flies, of consumption, rheumatism and other
physical punishments for the breaking of nature’s laws. But what do the learned
justices care for the laws of nature? Capitalist laws are alone sacred to them!
What are wage workers for but to be exploited!172
While none ultimately followed through, 85,000 bakers threatened to strike and cause a
bread famine.173 The Worker, a prominent socialist newspaper, declared the outcome of
the Lochner case, “a new Dred Scott decision.”174 As such, it is clear that unions across
the country regarded the decision as a highly political one. As put by Victoria Nourse at
the Georgetown Law Center:
Such cases sent children to the mills and sweatshops, allowed employers to
prevent individuals from joining unions, restricted the ability of unions to boycott,
and kept minimum wage and hour legislation for able-bodied men in litigation
limbo for thirty years. People demonstrated, fought, and voted based on these
issues; these cases left such an important impression because there were focal
points for the discontent of great masses of people.175
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With industrialization rapidly changing the economic landscape of the United States,
government’s role in shaping the public’s social outlook and fiscal welfare needed to
evolve. For many urban, working class people, the Court came to represent an out-oftouch institutional body that had appropriated the authority (and, some would say,
exercised the audacity) to overrule the democratic will of society’s most vulnerable.
The decision also clearly impacted election rhetoric and politicians’ views of the
judiciary. The 1912 Progressive party platform supported “such restrictions of the power
of the courts as shall leave to the people the ultimate authority to determine fundamental
questions of social welfare and public policy.” 176 Insofar as the judiciary commandeers
the authority to settle questions rightly left to the people and their respective legislatures,
this may be regarded as politicization in and of itself.
However, it was Theodore Roosevelt who became one of Lochner’s most avid
critics. While he did not specifically deny the existence of a liberty of contract, Roosevelt
publicly criticized the decision because it fundamentally disregarded the will of the
people to decide a question of public policy that he believed rightly fell within the
legislative realm. The decision, he declared, was “nominally against State rights… but
really against popular rights, against the democratic principle of government by the
people under the forms of law.” 177 At a later date, he further articulated his position:
In the New York Bakeshop Case it is our duty to say that it is for the people of a
State to decide whether they intend to be true to the school of political economy
of the eighteenth century individualism philosophers or whether they intend to act
176
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on the principles set forth in such books as those of Professor Rose on “Social
Control” and by Father Ryan on “A Living Wage.” 178
Thus, while he did not attack the notion of substantive due process doctrine as faulty
jurisprudence in and of itself, he did bristle at the notion that judicial intervention
undermined the will of the people, as reflected in duly enacted legislation. When running
in the 2012 presidential election, Roosevelt called Lochner a manifestation of judicial
“tyranny.”179 And, while Woodrow Wilson ultimately won the election, then-President
Taft believed the Constitution was the “supreme issue” of the race. 180
The Lochner case set a longstanding federal legal precedent under which the
Court struck down the regulation of the sale of securities, standardization of the price of
gasoline, and other state measures.181 In light of the number of cases that followed in
Lochner’s footsteps and the impact these cases had on the lives of an increasingly
disgruntled working class, it is no wonder that “Lochner” is among the only Supreme
Court cases to give birth to an “era.” For these reasons—and based on a structured
analysis—it appears clear that the Lochner decision is accurately associated with
increased politicization of the Supreme Court and the judiciary generally.
However, it could be argued that Lochner’s politicizing effects were ultimately
short-lived and relatively less pronounced than the case studies to be examined in the
latter half of the 20th century. Indeed, Lochner’s legacy was tempered by the Court’s
return to a more fact and circumstance-based jurisprudence. In contrast to the Lochner
decision, which relied heavily on abstract principle, subsequent “liberty of contract”
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cases began to look much more seriously at the present conditions and particulars of the
legislation at issue. For example, in Muller v. Oregon (1908), the Court upheld a law
limiting the work of women in factories due to their “physical structure.” 182 According to
Sidney G. Tarrow’s “Lochner versus New York: A Political Analysis,” this marked a
turning point from which the Court softened its strict adherence to the liberty of contract
doctrine and began to examine legislation “in the light of actual industrial conditions,
unlike their approach in the Lochner case.”183
Consider the following quote by Stephenson in “The Supreme Court and
Constitutional Change: Lochner v. New York”:
The Lochner litigation was one of the first opportunities presented for
constitutional confirmation of the modern regulatory state. Debate over the
constitutionality of the New York statute symbolized the broader dispute over
fundamental changes in the fabric of the American polity. 184
The case indeed came at a time of rapid political and economic change for the nation.
Ultimately, organized labor and many of its policies won the policy landscape through
the democratic process. As the court adjusted (or softened) its judicial philosophy
concerning substantive due process, the politicization of the Court as a potent election
issue dissipated. Particularly with World War I, the country at large faced pressing
challenges that threatened to compromise the stability of global relations, leaving
substantially less air time for bakers’ hours. As Professor Nourse observed:
The Progressive Era… was full of reform and regulation… from consumer
protection and the federal reserve to worker’s compensation; from regulations of
182

Sidney G. Tarrow, "Lochner versus New York: A Political Analysis," Labor History 5, no. 3 (1964):
303-304, doi:10.1080/00236566408583950.
https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/00236566408583950
183
Ibid., 303-304.
184
D. Grier Stephenson, Jr., "The Supreme Court and Constitutional Change: Lochner v. New York
Revisited," Villanova Law Review, 2nd ser., 21, no. 2 (1976): 221,
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2089&context=vlr.

77

drink, lotteries, fight films, and stolen cars to seditious speech to birth control—
and the Court’s case law did little to squelch any of these regulatory impulses, for
good or ill185
Thus, it appears that despite the Court’s convictions regarding the centrality of a
fundamental right to contract found nowhere in the constitutional text, the democratic
process was simply too powerful for even the most activist Court to oppose indefinitely.
For this reason, the politicization of the Supreme Court in this era became fully realized
at its tail end, but was ultimately extinguished with West Coast Hotel v. Parrish
(1937).186 Only with the nation in the midst of the Great Depression and the President
attempting to “pack” the Court did the body abandon its stringent final stand on economic
regulations.

Privacy, “Penumbras,” and Substantive Due Process
In order to understand natural rights jurisprudence in the 21st century, it is first
necessary to trace the rebirth and evolution of substantive due process beginning in the
1960s. For almost 30 years after the end of the Lochner era, the doctrine was scorned as a
blemish on American constitutional history. 187 However, its revitalization has marked an
interesting trend since the 1960s: in general, the American public increasingly favor the
rights protected by the Court in this new period. Access to contraception, abortion, and
other “private” privileges against intrusion from the state are all concepts that, from a
political perspective, many Americans (if not an emerging majority) appear willing to

185

Victoria F. Nourse, "A Tale of Two Lochners: The Untold History of Substantive Due Process and the
Idea of Fundamental Rights," California Law Review, 3rd ser., 97, no. 3 (June 2009): 754,
https://scholarship.law.berkeley.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1135&context=californialawreview.
186
Ibid., 792.
187
D. Grier Stephenson, Jr., "The Supreme Court and Constitutional Change: Lochner v. New York
Revisited," Villanova Law Review, 2nd ser., 21, no. 2 (1976): 217,
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2089&context=vlr.

78

support at the ballot box. However, this does not necessarily make these public policies
constitutional rights.
The Court’s decision to embrace this unique, new form of substantive due process
certainly has enlarged its scope to include rulings on intimate questions previously
reserved to the political arena. Largely as a consequence, our Supreme Court (and the
federal judiciary generally) has experienced the political attention, scrutiny, and
polarization it does today. In discussing this phenomenon, this chapter will examine three
landmark cases: Griswold v. Connecticut (1965), Roe v. Wade (1973), and Planned
Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey (1992). After outlining the decisions
themselves, this paper then analyzes their implications with respect to the politicization
of the Supreme Court.

Griswold v. Connecticut (1965)
Although the notion of a constitutional “right to privacy” (particularly in the form
of bodily autonomy) was most famously solidified in popular culture by Roe v. Wade
(1973), the understanding that the Constitution implies such a liberty without its explicit
mention developed from Griswold v. Connecticut (1965). In this case, the named
appellant, Estelle Griswold, the Executive Director of Planned Parenthood League of
Connecticut, challenged Section §§ 53-32 of the Connecticut General Statutes, which
stated:
Any person who uses any drug, medicinal article or instrument for the purpose of
preventing conception shall be fined not less than fifty dollars or imprisoned not
less than sixty days nor more than one year or be both fined and imprisoned. 188
In addition, Section 54-196 held:
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Any person who assists, abets, counsels, causes, hires or commands another to
commit any offense may be prosecuted and punished as if he were the principal
offender.189
The Planned Parenthood League of Connecticut provided counsel on contraception to
both married and unmarried couples. When found in violation of these state laws,
Griswold and others were fined $100 each. 190 They then sued in state court, asserting that
the statute violated an implied constitutional right to marital privacy.
In the 7-2 majority opinion, Justice Douglas remarked that a number of the
provisions in the Bill of Rights were indirectly implicated by the questions posed in
Griswold v. Connecticut. For example, while the First Amendment holds no scripted right
of “association,” the Court had repeatedly affirmed the right to gather in means that were
of “social, legal, and economic benefit [to] the members.”191 Justice Douglas continued:
The right of "association”... includes the right to express one's attitudes or
philosophies by membership in a group or by affiliation with it or by other lawful
means. Association in that context is a form of expression of opinion, and, while
it is not expressly included in the First Amendment, its existence is necessary in
making the express guarantees fully meaningful. 192
In a similar manner, Justice Douglas contended that the notion of “privacy” is found
throughout the Bill of Rights, and that insofar as the common thread can be reasonably
discerned, its application must be consequential. The Third Amendment prohibits the
quartering of soldiers during peacetime in private houses. The Fourth Amendment
affirms the “right of the people to be secure… against unreasonable searches and
seizures.”193 Meanwhile the Fifth Amendment right to protection against self-
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incrimination affords citizens a so-called “zone” of privacy that government may not
force him to surrender to his detriment. And, finally, the Ninth Amendment provides that
the written proclamation of various rights “shall not be construed to deny or disparage
others retained by the people.” 194 By tying these Amendments together, Justice Douglas
painted a picture of the “emanations” and “penumbras” he used to justify the remainder
of his decision. 195
Relying on this string of assertions, Justice Douglas then contended that the
Griswold case before the Court “concerns a relationship lying within the zone of privacy
created by several fundamental constitutional guarantees.” 196 He wrote:
We deal with a right of privacy older than the Bill of Rights—older than our
political parties, older than our school system. Marriage is a coming together for
better or for worse, hopefully enduring, and intimate to the degree of being
sacred. It is an association that promotes a way of life, not causes; a harmony in
living, not political faiths; a bilateral loyalty, not commercial or social projects.
Yet it is an association for as noble a purpose as any involved in our prior
decisions.197
Insofar as the law remained in this realm, the governmental purpose “may not be
achieved by means which sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area of
protected freedoms."198 Furthermore, since robust enforcement of the Connecticut statute
would require governmental search and intrusion into the bedrooms of married couples,
he alleged the law “is repulsive to the notions of privacy surrounding the marriage
relationship.”199

194

Id., 484.
Id., 484.
196
Id., 485.
197
Id., 486.
198
Id., 485.
199
Id., 486.
195

81

Indeed, the Connecticut law was repugnant to ordered conceptions of marital
unions. However, robust reading of the law requires more than mere associative
reasoning about abstract ideas. Any astute observer should understand that the text of the
First, Third, and Fourth Amendments imply, in some sense, a certain right of privacy
against the state. However, this is the case for virtually any law proclaiming that the
government cannot do something. The Bill of Rights was, of course, precisely designed
to achieve this purpose. By definition, when a restriction on government intervention
exists, some corollary private liberty resides explicitly for the people. With that being
said, a specifically enumerated provision in the Bill of Rights need not imply any
protection for rights not explicitly mentioned (with the obvious exception of the Ninth
Amendment). While the notion of state authorities barging into the bedrooms of intimate
couples to determine whether they use contraception is surely offensive to the notion of
civil liberty, Justice Douglas failed to seriously formulate his reasoning from the
constitutional text itself. Rather, he extrapolated from various unconnected Amendments
in order to reach a conclusion that while viscerally agreeable and politically expedient, is
legally problematic.
It is of note that Justice Douglas grounded his decision by connecting the alleged
right of marital privacy to a value that is fundamental in nature to American social life.
Thus, he voted to side with the majority not because he disliked the Connecticut law
(although he almost surely did), but because it was antithetical to a deeply-rooted
institution. Thus, the ruling was grounded in the Court’s understanding of a fundamental
social institution that was “older than the Bill of Rights—older than our political
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parties…”200 This analysis is very different than that developed by the Supreme Court in
the coming decades, which, as discussed below, focused on the personal autonomy of the
individual, “respect,” or “dignity.” Meanwhile, the liberties protected by Griswold v.
Connecticut were those supposedly essential to our historical traditions. In the future,
Justice Scalia would remark on how this would change:
Within the last 20 years, we have found to be covered by due process the right to
abortion, which was so little rooted in the traditions of the American people that it
was criminal for 200 years; the right to homosexual sodomy, which was so little
rooted in the traditions of the American people that it was criminal for 200
years.201
At some point, then, the Court would begin to more boldly substitute its moral
judgements for those of various legislatures. However, in the seminal case of Griswold v.
Connecticut (1965), the Court’s decision was rooted in the essentially historical
observation that there was something deeply un-American in a law that invaded the
bedrooms of married couples.
Regardless, a textualist approach to constitutional interpretation would support
Justice Black’s dissent: “The Court talks about a constitutional "right of privacy" as
though there is some constitutional provision or provisions forbidding any law ever to be
passed which might abridge the "privacy" of individuals. But there is not.” 202 Justice
Black contended that substantive due process provided the Court a kind of “blank check”
to invalidate laws that it deemed improper, rather than illegal. He stated:
The due process argument… is vested with power to invalidate all state laws that
it considers to be arbitrary, capricious, unreasonable, or oppressive, or on this
200
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Court's belief that a particular state law under scrutiny has no "rational or
justifying" purpose, or is offensive to a "sense of fairness and justice." If these
formulas based on "natural justice"... are to prevail, they require judges to
determine what is or is not constitutional on the basis of their own appraisal
of what laws are unwise or unnecessary. The power to make such decisions
is, of course, that of a legislative body. 203
Justice Black was precisely right. Throughout his tenure on the Supreme Court, Justice
Black continually employed his strict adherence to the text of the Constitution in order to
defend the system of governance the Framers intended. As he once told the New York
Times in 1967, “I was against using due process to force the views of judges on the
country. I still am. I wouldn’t trust judges with that kind of power and the Founders did
not trust them either.”204 Whether against “economic liberty” arguments in cases such
Carolene Products (1937) or privacy contentions in the final terms of his tenure, Justice
Black vigorously denounced substantive due process even when doing so was
inconsistent with his own personal, political preferences.
It is noteworthy that Justice John Marshall Harlan II’s dissent in Poe v. Ullman
(1961), the predecessor case to Griswold v. Connecticut, provided one of the most
strident (and oft cited) defenses of substantive due process to date. In it, Justice Harlan
asserted that the liberty implied in the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause
prescribed "a rational continuum which, broadly speaking, includes a freedom from all
substantial arbitrary impositions and purposeless restraints."205 Unfortunately, the
difficulty in adjudicating along such lines is determining what is “arbitrary” or
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“purposeless” and what is not. While liberal legal scholars often hail the dissent as one of
the pre-eminent, early defenses of the doctrine, Justice Harlan specifically rejected the
notion that the due process doctrine could be stretched to the lengths it reaches today:
The laws regarding marriage which provide both when the sexual powers may be
used and the legal and societal context in which children are born and brought up,
as well as laws forbidding adultery, fornication and homosexual practices
which express the negative of the proposition, confining sexuality to lawful
marriage, form a pattern so deeply pressed into the substance of our social
life that any Constitutional doctrine in this area must build upon that
basis….It is one thing when the State exerts its power either to forbid
extramarital sexuality altogether, or to say who may marry, but it is quite
another when, having acknowledged a marriage and the intimacies inherent in it,
it undertakes to regulate by means of the criminal law the details of that
intimacy.206
Thus, it is clear that (at least at the time of the Griswold ruling) the scope of due process
was dependent on what was “deeply pressed into the substance” of American social life.
50 years ago, same-sex relations, extramarital sexuality, and a myriad of other social
mores did not fall into this category.
It should perhaps be emphasized that even justices who are deeply concerned
about judicial overreach via the Due Process Clause fail to adequately account for the
power their precedents may set. According to Justice Byron White in his dissenting
opinion in Moore v. East Cleveland (1977), "no one was more sensitive than Mr. Justice
Harlan to any suggestion that his approach to the Due Process Clause would lead to
judges roaming at large in the constitutional field." 207 As we will see in the coming
sections, notions of “privacy” or “personal liberty” allegedly embedded in the Fourteenth
Amendment have expanded tremendously since Griswold. Indeed, Justice Kennedy
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regarded Griswold as the “most pertinent beginning point” 208 for the reasoning he would
employ in Lawrence v. Texas (2003).
Often, like in Griswold, subsequent due process decisions are similarly reasonable
from a political or social standpoint. However, from a legal perspective, it appears that
the scope of due process is defined by what particular justices believe is “arbitrary” at a
certain point in time. As such, its limits are extraordinarily vague and difficult to define,
let alone maintain.

Roe v. Wade (1973)
Although the notion that substantive due process protects various aspects of
private life was solidified in Griswold v. Connecticut, Stanley v. Georgia, Meyer v.
Nebraska, as well as several other cases, Roe v. Wade (1973) remains the best known
modern case addressing the scope of the Due Process Clause in the context of private life.
In it, Norma L. McCorvey (known as “Jane Doe”), a resident of Texas, sought an
abortion in her home state of Texas. 209 At the time, Articles 1191-1194 and 1196 of the
Texas Penal Code made it illegal for women to have an abortion unless it was “procured
or attempted by medical advice for the purpose of saving the life of the mother."210 After
attempting and failing to obtain an abortion, she filed suit against Henry Wade, the
District Attorney for Dallas County, alleging that the Texas statutes were
unconstitutionally vague and that they abridged her right of personal privacy, protected
by the First, Fourth, Fifth, Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendments.211
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Justice Blackmun delivered the opinion of the Court. In his decision, he declared
that despite the deep philosophical, religious, and personal implications of abortion
statutes, “Our task, of course, is to resolve the issue by constitutional measurement, free
of emotion and of predilection.”212 Before delving into the heart of the argument,
Blackmun proceeded to do a deep dive into the ancient history of abortion in an apparent
attempt to discredit the validity of the state prohibition (and similar, modern statutes
across the country). He noted that, “it perhaps is not generally appreciated that the
restrictive criminal abortion laws in effect in a majority of States today are of relatively
recent vintage.”213 However, the validity of such an assertion as well as the robust
backstory is not relevant to solving the case at hand.
He then stated:
This right of privacy, whether it be founded in the Fourteenth Amendment's
concept of personal liberty and restrictions upon state action, as we feel it is, or, as
the District Court determined, in the Ninth Amendment’s reservation of rights to
the people, is broad enough to encompass a woman's decision whether or not to
terminate her pregnancy. 214
Of course, as noted previously, the text of the Fourteenth Amendment itself merely
makes clear that an individual may, in fact, be deprived of his life, liberty, or property, as
long as the deprivation is done in accordance with “due process.” And while
unenumerated or “natural rights” jurisprudence philosophy is arguably consistent with a
textualist reading of the Ninth Amendment, it is far from clear that the right to an
abortion is one reserved “to the people” rather than a matter of public policy reserved to
the state. Furthermore, such an understanding requires neglect of various historical
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circumstances in addition to abstract, principle-based reasoning. Justice Blackmun
continued:
As noted above, a State may properly assert important interests in safeguarding
health, in maintaining medical standards, and in protecting potential life. At some
point in pregnancy, these respective interests become sufficiently compelling to
sustain regulation of the factors that govern the abortion decision. The privacy
right involved, therefore, cannot be said to be absolute…. We, therefore, conclude
that the right of personal privacy includes the abortion decision, but that this right
is not unqualified and must be considered against important state interests in
regulation.215
Weighing the state interest against that of the pregnant mother, however, is precisely
what the Texas state legislature had already done. Again, such a “balancing act” is
emphatically not the prerogative of the Courts or the judicial branch.
Blackmun’s concession that, at “some point,” the “state interests as to protection
of health, medical standards, and prenatal life, become dominant” made clear that such
priorities may be compelling. 216 Indeed, the rationale for state action in this area was
explained at length early in the opinion:
The State’s interest and general obligation to protect life then extends, it is
argued, to prenatal life… recognition may be given to the less rigid claim that as
long as at least potential life is involved, the State may assert interests beyond the
protection of the pregnant woman alone.217
However, the honorable Justice believed that the state’s interest was to be given
substantial weight only after the first trimester. Why, precisely, is far from clear.
Interestingly, Justice Blackmun’s first draft of the Roe opinion was less sweeping
than the final version. 218 Preliminarily, the right to an abortion would be extended only to
215
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the first trimester of pregnancy. However, after a suggestion from Justice Lewis Powell’s
clerk, the time frame was extended. 219 Since 90 percent of abortions take place in the first
trimester, Professor Klarman remarked that:
late-term abortions are a symbolic issue but one of great potency, as Republicans
have shown in the last 15 years. Roe put the court on the wrong side of public
opinion by extending the right beyond what the public was willing to accept. 220
Thus, the error of Roe was twofold: First, and most importantly, Justice Blackmun
employed suspect legal doctrine to undermine the democratic will of dozens of states and
millions of Americans. Second, he extended the scope of his decision far beyond where
he needed to in order to accomplish the crux of his agenda.
On the other side of the debate, Justice White’s scathing dissent lashed his
colleagues for their alleged judicial overreach:
I find nothing in the language or history of the Constitution to support the Court's
judgment. The Court simply fashions and announces a new constitutional right for
pregnant women and, with scarcely any reason or authority for its action, invests
that right with sufficient substance to override most existing state abortion
statutes. The upshot is that the people and the legislatures of the 50 States are
constitutionally disentitled to weigh the relative importance of the continued
existence and development of the fetus, on the one hand, against a spectrum
of possible impacts on the woman, on the other hand. As an exercise of raw
judicial power, the Court perhaps has authority to do what it does today;
but, in my view, its judgment is an improvident and extravagant exercise of
the power of judicial review that the Constitution extends to this Court. 221
By declaring that only at a certain point in a woman’s pregnancy was the life of the fetus
a compelling interest for the state, Justice Blackmun and the majority exempted the issue
of abortion (at least in large part) from the democratic process. As the following section
will demonstrate, the “realm(s)” protected by substantive due process has grown even
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further since Roe. Indeed, its expansion has risen to the point where it is exercised in lieu
of more applicable constitutional provisions and doctrines.

Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey (1992)
The Court revisited the issue of abortion in Planned Parenthood v. Casey (1992).
At this point in the Rehnquist Court’s era, conservatives appeared poised to overturn the
Roe ruling with the votes of Justices Sandra Day O’Connor, Antonin Scalia, Clarence
Thomas, David Souter, and the Chief Justice himself. Additionally, Justice White (who
was appointed by a Democrat), had originally dissented in Roe, as well. As part of a
promise on the campaign trail, Republican presidential candidate Ronald Reagan pledged
to nominate a woman to the highest bench in the land.222 Especially towards the end of
O’Connor’s tenure on the Supreme Court, her record demonstrated herself to be much
more of centrist than many initially anticipated. To some legal analysts’ surprise,
O’Connor, Souter, and Kennedy voted to uphold the “essential holding” in Roe:
Concluding that consideration of the fundamental constitutional question resolved
by Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, principles of institutional integrity, and the rule of
stare decisis require that Roe’s essential holding be retained and reaffirmed… At
the heart of liberty is the right to define one's own concept of existence, of
meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human life. Beliefs about these
matters could not define the attributes of personhood were they formed under
compulsion of the State. 223
This was surely the most bold—and almost certainly most romantic—description of what
is encompassed by substantive due process. How such a proposition should be applied is
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not entirely clear, and the Court refrained from establishing a structured system or
framework for future cases.
Furthermore, the decision stated:
Overruling Roe’s central holding would not only reach an unjustifiable result
under stare decisis principles, but would seriously weaken the Court’s capacity to
exercise the judicial power and to function as the Supreme Court of a Nation
dedicated to the rule of law. 224
First and foremost, Planned Parenthood affirmed the conclusion reached in Roe that the
Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause encompasses a substantive element to the
word “liberty” that protects a woman’s qualified right to bodily autonomy, and therefore
abortion. However, the decision also explained at length the importance of the doctrine of
stare decisis. The opinion stated that when having decided an issue of “national
controversy” by “accepting a common mandate rooted in the Constitution,’ the Court
must be extremely cautious not to be guilty of or giving the perception of being guilty of,
“surrender[ing] to political pressure.”225
Indeed, in the long run, constantly changing precedent may threaten to undermine
the credibility of the Court system and rule of law generally. However, in and of itself,
precedent can only tell us what was done, not what was done well. Furthermore, failing to
overturn bad rulings simply because they were declared recently is, in fact, taking
political considerations into judicial decision-making. As noted by Justice Rehnquist's
opinion:
Under this principle, when the Court has ruled on a divisive issue, it is apparently
prevented from overruling that decision for the sole reason that it was incorrect,
unless opposition to the original decision has died away.226
224
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Such an understanding of stare decisis would be truly novel and, perhaps even more
importantly, dangerous to the role of the Court. Indeed, as argued by Justice Scalia, in its
effort not to appear overly political, the Court arguably swayed in the other direction:
The only principle the Court “adheres” to, it seems to me, is the principle that the
Court must be seen as standing by Roe. That is not a principle of law (which is
what I thought the Court was talking about), but a principle of Realpolitik—and a
wrong one at that.227
In response to the heart of the argument proposed by the majority opinion, Justice Scalia
continued:
The permissibility of abortion, and the limitations upon it, are to be resolved like
most important questions in our democracy: by citizens trying to persuade one
another and then voting….How upsetting it is, that so many of our citizens
(good people, not lawless ones, on both sides of this abortion issue, and on
various sides of other issues as well) think that we Justices should properly take
into account their views, as though we were engaged not in ascertaining an
objective law but in determining some kind of social consensus. The Court would
profit, I think, from giving less attention to the fact of this distressing
phenomenon, and more attention to the cause of it. That cause permeates today’s
opinion: a new mode of constitutional adjudication that relies not upon text
and traditional practice to determine the law, but upon what the Court calls
“reasoned judgment,” which turns out to be nothing but philosophical
predilection and moral intuition. 228
This excerpt perfectly synthesized the overarching problem with an overly expansive,
substantive interpretation of the Due Process Clause or Ninth Amendment. In order to
protect various “essential spheres of liberty,” regardless of how politically appealing or
apparently “natural,” the judiciary necessarily deprives citizens of their democratic right
to resolve the issue themselves. While they may not reach the correct, satisfactory, or
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even moral decision, the ultimate right to determine public policy is their own. Indeed, it
is not altogether surprising that Justice Scalia equated the judgment of the Court that day
to that of Chief Justice Taney in Dred Scott.229 The desire to end an issue, particularly
one with such divisive consequences for the country, can be overwhelming for judges. It
is arguable that Blackmun and the majority, under the name of substantive due process
and guise of legitimate constitutional law, fell vulnerable to the same kind of political
expediency.

Griswold, Roe, Planned Parenthood, and the Politicization of the Supreme Court
In measuring the extent to which Griswold, Roe, and Planned Parenthood
contributed to the politicization of the Supreme Court, we return to the familiar analytical
framework:
● The degree to which the Court makes controversial decisions that are important to
the public and inconsistent with the strongly held views of a not insubstantial
sector of the public, based on a rationale that is obscure.
● The extent to which the Supreme Court deviates (or appears to deviate) from
established precedent or modes of judicial interpretation to reach a particular
result in cases that have broad political implications.
● The extent to which Supreme Court composition is the focus of political
processes, including election rhetoric and voting priorities.
● The extent to which Supreme Court nomination and confirmation is subject to a
political litmus test, especially at the expense of judicial qualifications and
expertise.
● The degree to which Supreme Court justices are polarized along the legal
spectrum.
Based on this analytical framework, it would appear that the direct politicizing
effect of Griswold was negligible. The Connecticut law regulating contraceptive use
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invalidated in the case was rarely enforced—and, as a direct consequence, even the most
conservative of the state’s constituents did not gather up in arms as a result of the Court’s
ruling. And, while the Supreme Court was a major issue in the 1968 election, 230 the
Griswold case was not the focus of that year’s electioneering. Nor did the Supreme Court
nomination and confirmation processes begin to apply a “Griswold litmus test,” and the
Griswold decision did not result in lasting schisms or substantive polarization within the
Court. Indeed, even the democratic process saw very little movement to revitalize aspects
of the law. Nonetheless, as the first decision to announce a “privacy” right inherent in the
Fourteenth Amendment, the decision was pivotal to the ultimate resolution of more
controversial cases.
Roe, on the other hand, ranks as a highly (if not the most) politicizing case based
on all of the factors enumerated above. With respect to the first factor, it is clear that—
then and now—the country is extremely divided over the issue of abortion. According to
Harvard Law School Professor Michael Klarman, when it released the Roe decision, “the
Supreme Court struck down the abortion laws of 46 states and opened the floodgates for
a wave of opposition that has never abated.” 231 Professor Klarman argues that the Court’s
decision relied heavily on a 1972 poll that concluded 63% of Americans thought abortion
should be a “private decision between women and their doctors,” although 32 states still
allowed abortions only when a woman’s life was in danger. 232 Of course, the nation had
not reached such a consensus. In fact, according to an article published by Time titled, “A
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Stunning Approval for Abortion,” a poll directly prior to the decision demonstrated that
abolishing first-trimester restrictions was favored among Americans by only one
percentage point more than those in opposition. 233 Thus, while the matter was resolved
legally, the piece concluded that “it remains a lightning rod for intense national
debate.”234
Indeed, Klarman argues that, in large part, politicizing Supreme Court cases have
occurred in the latter half of the 20th century because the progressive bench was too far
ahead of the rest of the country. 235 This conclusion is also promoted by scholars such as
William Eskridge, who contends that the Supreme Court’s issuance of such a farreaching decision led pro-life Americans to explore other, more extreme measures in
order to accomplish their policy goals outside the traditional democratic arena. 236 In
overstepping its bounds, the Court not only confounded legislatures across the country
with an impracticable trimester framework to assess the constitutional validity of state
regulation, but also strengthened the ferocity of pro-life activist movements.
Furthermore, the rationale expressed in Roe concerning the “right to privacy” was
quite obscure. The Court failed to adequately or definitively articulate the theories’
limitations, which explains why many, including Justice White, found the decision to
represent “an exercise of raw judicial power.” 237 The vagueness of Justice Blackmun’s
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private liberty interest in Roe was perhaps only superseded by Justice Kennedy’s “heart
of liberty” passage. It can hardly be said that the Framers (or even a substantial block of
the American public) were comfortable with the judiciary deciding contentious matters
on the grounds of what constitutes a sufficiently important “mystery of the universe.”
The second factor assesses the extent to which the Supreme Court deviates (or
appears to deviate) from established precedent or modes of judicial interpretation to reach
a particular result. In fact, a good argument can be made that the Court’s failure to
articulate a clear and easily understood rationale for its decision has contributed to the
ongoing controversy. While the reaction to Roe was undoubtedly due in large part to the
controversial nature of abortion, it is also in part explained by the lack of clear textual
support in the Constitution for the Court’s expansive reading of the Due Process Clause.
Supposedly, privileges protected by substantive due process fall under a category
of “fundamental” rights. These are, in theory, practices so intrinsically vital to the human
or American experience that their deprivation—regardless of the legal process by which
they are taken—constitutes a blatant affront to natural law. In light of the robust
controversy surrounding the issue of abortion, how could the Court reasonably conclude
that a women’s right to a first trimester abortion was “fundamental” in this sense?
Under the name of “natural rights” and with little textual grounding for its claims,
the 7-2 majority appeared to much of the American public as ivory tower progressives
who simply “knew better” than the people themselves. And despite remarkably consistent
political division over the morality of abortion, the Warren, Burger, and Rehnquist Courts
would use the framework adopted in Roe to overturn spousal notification, parental
consent, and informed consent requirements. In this manner, more than 40 years before
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Obergefell v. Hodges (2015), the Court opened itself to a judicial “slippery slope” that
would provide fodder for conservative attacks for decades. Indeed, the nuts, bolts, and
runway were far more slippery than anticipated.
Even those who defend the ultimate outcome, such as legal scholars Heymann
and Barzelay, note that the valid underlying “principles” elucidated by Justice
Blackmun’s majority opinion were:
never adequately articulated by the opinion of the Court… [which] leaves the
impression that the abortion decisions rest in part on unexplained precedents, in
part on an extremely tenuous relation to provisions of the Bill of Rights, and in
part on a raw exercise of judicial fiat. 238
And, while this thesis disagrees that the principles themselves were acceptable, the point
still holds that the poorly constructed argument itself further strengthened the case of the
Court’s detractors, leaving the institution open to charges that the decision was a political
rather than judicial one.
Third, Roe had—and continues to have—an enormous impact on both election
rhetoric and political processes. Interestingly, though, it appears it took some time for the
Republican Party to formalize itself as the “pro-life” party. In fact, the 1976 Republican
Party Platform was relatively nuanced on the issue:
The question of abortion is one of the most difficult and controversial of our
time…. There are those in our Party who favor complete support for the Supreme
Court decision which permits abortion on demand. There are others who share
sincere convictions that the Supreme Court's decision must be changed by a
constitutional amendment prohibiting all abortions. Others have yet to take a
position, or they have assumed a stance somewhere in between polar positions….
The Republican Party favors a continuance of the public dialogue on abortion and
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supports the efforts of those who seek enactment of a constitutional amendment to
restore protection of the right to life for unborn children. 239
To the nation’s surprise, it was a former movie star who capitalized on the increasingly
organized political movement around abortion and the Court system. According to
Klarman:
Roe v. Wade generated a politically potent right-to-life movement that helped
elect Ronald Reagan president in 1980 and has significantly influenced national
politics ever since. 240
Alongside pledging to nominate the first woman justice to the Supreme Court, the former
California Governor also promised his fellow Republicans to appoint someone who
would help overturn the Roe decision, as well as those that prohibited prayer in
schools.241 Indeed, political mobilization around figures such as Jerry Falwell, founder of
the Moral Majority coalition, was robust in the 1980s, and the organization’s support of
Reagan was both early and fervent. 242
Interestingly, as Governor of the Golden State, Reagan himself had signed
legislation loosening restrictions for abortion procedures.243 And, as President, Reagan’s
judicial appointments, particularly those to the Supreme Court, were not all subject to the
kind of “litmus test” we see today. Justice O’Connor, for example, had a mixed record
while in Arizona politics and, in his personally diary, Reagan wrote of the soon-to-be
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Justice: "Called Judge O'Connor and told her she was my nominee for Supreme Court.
Already the flak is starting and from my own supporters. Right to Life people say she is
pro abortion. She declares abortion is personally repugnant to her. I think she'll make a
good Justice."244 However, the religious right was furious.
Reverend Falwell warned that the “church people could leave him [Reagan] in
droves,”245 while the head of the National Pro-life Political Action Committee, Peter
Gemma Jr., regarded the nomination as a “contradiction to the Republican Party
Platform” and “everything that candidate Reagan said and even President Reagan has
said in regard to social issues.” 246 Despite impending party realignment over social
issues, it appears the religious right did not yet have the power in the 1980s it does today
to institute a “political litmus” test for Supreme Court justices.
However, it is clear President Reagan’s opposition to abortion grew more
pronounced as his presidency went on. In 1983, he published the first book written by a
sitting President, “Abortion and the Conscience of a Nation:”
Make no mistake, abortion-on-demand is not a right granted by the Constitution.
No serious scholar, including one disposed to agree with the Court’s result, has
argued that the framers of the Constitution intended to create such a right. Shortly
after the Roe v. Wade decision, Professor John Hart Ely, now Dean of Stanford
Law School, wrote that the opinion “is not constitutional law and gives almost no
sense of an obligation to try to be.” Nowhere do the plain words of the
Constitution even hint at a “right” so sweeping as to permit abortion up to the
time the child is ready to be born. Yet that is what the Court ruled. 247
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Reagan went on to compare the audacity of the Court’s sweeping decision to Dred Scott,
connect abortion to infanticide, and cite the Declaration of Independence in both his
moral and judicial arguments against the Roe decision as well as those who support the
alleged “right to choose.”248 From then on, Reagan’s first-choice appointments would be
more stringent on the issue. Of course, only Justice Antonin Scalia (again, not receiving a
single dissenting vote from the Senate), and not Robert Bork, would make the initial cut.
Only as a consequence of Bork’s Senate rejection would Ronald Reagan nominate
Anthony Kennedy, who would be much more sympathetic to “privacy” issues during his
tenure.
As time has passed since Roe, the decision has created perhaps the most
unbreakable “litmus test” for Democratic and Republican nominees alike. Today, it is
hard to imagine a Democrat nominating a Justice to the highest Court in the land without
a clear record affirming women’s “right to choose.” Similarly, the far-right evangelical
vote remains a strong voice in the Republican Party. While it appears conservative
Presidents have failed to adequately vet justices on this issue in the past, the appointment
of Justice Gorsuch may mark a trend towards more stringent consistency in this regard.
Finally, the degree to which justices are politicized along the legal spectrum when
it comes to abortion merits careful consideration. When Roe was initially announced, no
decision went so boldly against public opinion on a contentious social issue. By the time
of Planned Parenthood v. Casey, the Court ended with a more moderate outcome—one
that upheld certain restrictions on abortion while negating others. However, while some
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have lauded the decision as a kind of compromise on a difficult matter, the push and pull
of various interests regarding public policy should be the product of the legislative realm.
To a justice who prioritizes the letter of the law, there can be no such “wiggle
room.” In other words, a moderate may simply be someone who rules in accordance with
“what is halfway between what the text means and what she would like it to mean.” 249
While this may be a means of decreasing the “gap” between justices on the legal
spectrum in accordance with various quantitative metrics, upholding the “essential”
holding in Roe effectively meant that the justices were no less polarized than in 1973. Of
course, this was well exemplified by Justice Scalia’s dissent.

Sodomy, Same-Sex Marriage, and Substantive Due Process
In Bowers v. Hardwick (1986), the Court ruled that the Fourteenth Amendment
did not imply a fundamental right to same-sex sodomy. However, it appears that the
Court’s stringent adherence to the doctrine of stare decisis articulated in Casey (1992)
was to be selectively applied since, in 2003, the Court reversed its Bowers precedent in
Lawrence v. Texas. The question must be asked: Were the justices in the Bower decision
more or less knowledgeable than the majority in Lawrence about what constituted
“fundamental rights?” Of course not, but societal views (and especially the opinions of
the “liberal elite”) had changed drastically. And while the Court’s decision was consistent
with the direction of the nation, its leap ahead reflected extraordinary impatience—not to
mention disregard for the democratic process—that further politicized its role within our
governing scheme.
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Bowers v. Hardwick (1986)
In delivering the opinion of the Court in Bowers v. Hardwick (1986), Justice
White drew a distinction between the previous privacy cases the Court had ruled upon
and the case at bar. In doing so, he explored what is meant by a “fundamental” right
protected by substantive due process. First, he turned to a case not discussed at length in
this thesis, Palko v. Connecticut (1937), which stated that the rights protected by the
doctrine are those implicit in the concept of “ordered liberty.” 250 Furthermore, in Moore
v. East Cleveland (1977), which dealt with a due process privacy claim involving zoning
ordinances and the “sanctity of the family,” the Court declared that fundamental rights
must be "deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition." 251 Since same-sex sodomy
was outlawed by all thirteen states during ratification of the Bill of Rights and the
practice had largely been regarded as a moral perversion since that time, Justice White
contended that the Court was not:
inclined to take a more expansive view of our authority to discover new
fundamental rights embedded in the Due Process Clause. The Court is most
vulnerable and comes nearest to illegitimacy when it deals with judge-made
constitutional law having little or no cognizable roots in the language or design of
the Constitution.252
On these grounds, the Court’s majority opinion firmly ruled that the alleged
constitutional right to engage in same-sex sodomy was “facetious, at best.” 253
Joined by Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens, Justice Blackmun delivered
the dissenting opinion. At the core of his argument was the assertion that the “private
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sphere” of liberty inherent in the Fourteenth Amendment is broader than that implied in
the majority opinion: “We protect those rights not because they contribute, in some direct
and material way, to the general public welfare, but because they form so central a part of
an individual's life.”254 Engaging in intimate behavior with another human being, Justice
Blackmun argued, is a vital part of the human experience. Insofar as there is no material
or moral difference between heterosexual and homosexual relations, the ability to engage
in such conduct should be uniform. And, especially since the Georgia law applied to both
heterosexual and homosexual sodomy, the Court should have struck it down on those
grounds.
Furthermore, in a footnote, Justice Blackmun went on to equate the case at hand
to Loving v. Virginia (1967), which legalized interracial marriage. 255 Resting on religious
arguments and the fact that many states prohibited interracial marriage when the
Fourteenth Amendment was ratified, the state of Virginia argued that the races should not
mix with respect to the marriage institution. According to the dissenting justices in
Bowers, then, viewing fundamental rights through a purely historical lens led to
unacceptable consequences (of course, Loving was largely decided on equal protection—
rather than substantive due process—grounds).
Similarly, Justice Blackmun argued in a footnote that one (albeit not the primary)
reasons the Court struck down the Connecticut General Statute prohibiting contraception
to married couples in Griswold was that enforcement of the law would almost certainly
represent an unreasonable search. 256 In a similar manner, regulating sexual relations—
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homosexual or otherwise—would necessarily require state intrusion into the bedrooms of
average Americans not otherwise charged with a crime. The question must be asked,
then, is it possible for the state to proactively enforce such a policy without
“unreasonably” surveilling its citizens? Thus, there were other potential grounds on
which the Court could have struck down the Georgia sodomy law. Rightly or wrongly,
the Court would overturn the Bowers ruling 17 years later.

Lawrence v. Texas (2003)
In Lawrence, the Court declared that the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process
Clause implied a substantive component that was broad enough to encompass intimate
homosexual relations between consenting adults. In response to a reported weapons
disturbance, officers in Houston, Texas entered the home of John Geddes Lawrence and
arrested him (alongside his sexual partner) for “deviate sexual behavior,” in violation of
Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 21.06(a). 257 After losing the case in the Court of Appeals for the
Fourteenth Texas District, the petitioners were granted writ of certiorari to the Supreme
Court.
The 5-4 majority opinion authored by Justice Kennedy struck down the laws of 13
states and declared that, in line with the individual liberty interest articulated in
Eisenstadt v. Baird (1972), the right to engage in intimate sexual relations fell under a
similar umbrella. Justice Kennedy proceeded to define the “liberty interest” broadly:
To say that the issue in Bowers was simply the right to engage in certain sexual
conduct demeans the claim the individual put forward, just as it would demean a
married couple were it to be said marriage is simply about the right to have sexual
intercourse.258
257
258
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Justice Kennedy thus made the case about more than sexual behavior, but about
“dignity.” In this manner, the Court formally departed its substantive due process
jurisprudence from one remotely tied to “ordered liberty,” deeply embedded traditions
and institutions, or even the elusive concept of “privacy.” And, while Justice Kennedy’s
Casey opinion was the first to articulate such a broad concept of implied liberty with his
“mystery of human life” paragraph, Lawrence further enlarged the protection afforded to
include the notion of “respect” for the individual:
It suffices for us to acknowledge that adults may choose to enter upon this
relationship in the confines of their homes and their own private lives and still
retain their dignity as free persons. When sexuality finds overt expression in
intimate conduct with another person, the conduct can be but one element in a
personal bond that is more enduring. The liberty protected by the Constitution
allows homosexual persons the right to make this choice. 259
Thus, it was the dignity to explore an intimate, “enduring bond” free of prosecution from
a governing entity that formed the basis of the Court’s opinion. From this angle, it is clear
how Lawrence foreshadowed the extension of due process protection to homosexual
marriage.
Joined by the Chief Justice and Justice Thomas, Justice Scalia wrote the primary
dissenting opinion, which, among other things, underscored the importance of allowing
the democratic process to run its course:
What Texas has chosen to do is well within the range of traditional democratic
action, and its hand should not be stayed through the invention of a brand-new
"constitutional right" by a Court that is impatient of democratic change. It is
indeed true that "later generations can see that laws once thought necessary and
proper in fact serve only to oppress," and when that happens, later generations can
repeal those laws. But it is the premise of our system that those judgments are to
be made by the people, and not imposed by a governing caste that knows best. 260
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Interestingly, from the time Bowers was decided, the number of states with the kind of
sexual sodomy laws that Lawrence overturned fell from 25 to 13. 261 Thus, Justice
Kennedy was indeed correct that society generally had begun to demonstrate an
“emerging awareness” that sex between consenting adults should be a private matter.
However, as argued by the dissenting opinion, how could an “emerging awareness”
possibly become a right “deeply embedded” in our traditions and culture as a society?
Rather than allowing citizens to debate and persuade each other to embrace a more
nuanced, genuine path to mutual understanding and respect for the gay community, the
Court simply mandated it (or at least attempted to). While perhaps an effective means of
furthering the socially progressive consensus that the nation would come to realize, the
“natural rights” argument put forth by the majority ultimately rested on precarious
footing and carefully selected precedent.
Justice Scalia warned in his dissenting Lawrence opinion not to believe the
majority’s assurance that the case “does not involve whether the government must give
formal recognition to any relationship that homosexual persons seek to enter.” 262 In one
of his many clever lines, he continued:
This case “does not involve” the issue of homosexual marriage only if one
entertains the belief that principle and logic have nothing to do with the decisions
of this Court. Many will hope that, as the Court comfortingly assures us, this is
so.263
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Thus, while many legal scholars did not anticipate Roe resulting from Griswold or
Lawrence from Casey, the existence (and speed) of the slippery slope had become
abundantly clear to proponents of a restrained judiciary by the start of the 21st century.

Obergefell v. Hodges (2015)
In Obergefell, the Court consolidated and granted writ of certiorari to cases from
Michigan, Kentucky, Ohio, and Tennessee, which had all defined marriage as a
contractual union between one man and one woman. 264 At issue were the following two
questions: 1) whether the Fourteenth Amendment requires states to issue marriage
licenses to couples of the same sex, 2) whether a state that does not authorize the issuance
of marriage licenses to homosexual is required to recognize the validity of such a license
issued by another state. Again, as in Planned Parenthood v. Casey and Lawrence v.
Texas, Justice Kennedy authored the Opinion of the Court. In doing so, he articulated
four fundamental principles that form the foundation of the Court’s decision declaring a
right of same-sex marriage: 1) that “the right to personal choice regarding marriage is
inherent in the concept of individual autonomy; 2) the marriage relationship is “a twoperson union unlike any other;” 3) the marriage relationship “safeguards children and
families and thus draws meaning from related rights of childrearing, procreation, and
education, and 4; that “marriage is a keystone of our social order.” 265 Throughout the rest
of his opinion, it appears that the equal protection clause was employed primarily in its
connection to substantive due process. The relationship between the equal protection and
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Due Process Clauses (and therefore the equality and liberty more generally) was
intertwined.
In what appears to have become characteristic of Justice Kennedy’s views
regarding the application of substantive due process cases, the majority opinion stated:
The nature of marriage is that, through its enduring bond, two persons together
can find other freedoms, such as expression, intimacy, and spirituality. This is true
for all persons, whatever their sexual orientation. 266
Again, the dignity to explore this relationship to its fullest potential formed the root of
what makes the two-person marriage generally (and, as applied in this case, same-sex
marriage) a fundamental right. Of course, as simply explained by Justice Thomas in his
dissenting opinion, there is no “Dignity Clause” in the Fourteenth Amendment. 267
Just as Theodore Roosevelt argued that the “Bakery Shop” case robbed the
American public of the right to decide a question of economic policy justly left in the
legislative arena, Justice Scalia wrote a scathing dissent, articulating his view of the
threat the majority decision posed to American democracy:
So it is not of special importance to me what the law says about marriage. It is of
overwhelming importance, however, who it is that rules me. Today’s decree says
that my Ruler, and the Ruler of 320 million Americans coast-to-coast, is a
majority of the nine lawyers on the Supreme Court. The opinion in these cases is
the furthest extension in fact—and the furthest extension one can even imagine—
of the Court’s claimed power to create “liberties” that the Constitution and its
Amendments neglect to mention. This practice of constitutional revision by an
unelected committee of nine, always accompanied (as it is today) by extravagant
praise of liberty, robs the People of the most important liberty they asserted in the
Declaration of Independence and won in the Revolution of 1776: the freedom to
govern themselves. 268
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Thus, it appears that regardless of the era, the Court’s decision to articulate firmly
justiciable, unenumerated rights has almost always been met with a backlash alleging
judicial intrusion of democratic processes. Insofar as “natural rights” such as “dignity”
exist, then, this thesis circles back to a question posed in the first section: Whose role is it
to define—let alone protect—them?

Bowers, Lawrence, Obergefell, and the Politicization of the Supreme Court
Of the cases in this chapter, Lawrence and Obergefell clearly had the most
politicizing effects. However, to careful observers of the Court’s apparently selective
adherence to the stare decisis doctrine, Bowers appears to play a consequential (albeit
indirect) role as well. By choosing to abide the principle in Casey and not Lawrence, the
Court ironically demonstrated to the American public that observance of stare decisis—if
not uniform—could delegitimize the institution. Of course, in evoking the doctrine, this is
precisely what O’Connor and the plurality opinion had sought to avoid. As the only two
cases in this chapter to strike down state laws, the remainder of the analysis will focus on
Lawrence v. Texas and Obergefell v. Hodges.
● The degree to which the Court makes controversial decisions that are important to
the public and inconsistent with the strongly held views of a not insubstantial
sector of the public, based on a rationale that is obscure.
● The extent to which the Supreme Court deviates (or appears to deviate) from
established precedent or modes of judicial interpretation to reach a particular
result in cases that have broad political implications.
● The extent to which Supreme Court composition is the focus of political
processes, including election rhetoric and voting priorities.
● The extent to which Supreme Court nomination and confirmation is subject to a
political litmus test, especially at the expense of judicial qualifications and
expertise.
● The degree to which Supreme Court justices are polarized along the legal
spectrum
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With respect to the first criteria outlined, it is worth discussing what constitutes a
“not insubstantial sector of the public.” The nation did indeed shift dramatically with
respect to its views of sodomy from 1986 to 2003. However, in those states that
maintained anti-sodomy laws on the books (and perhaps especially those specifically
targeting homosexual intimacy), religious evangelicals and other social conservatives
remained steadfast in their desire to repudiate homosexuality as a social ill. Of course, the
same could be said of constituents in states that had outlawed same-sex marriage. In
addition, employing the same “heart of liberty” foundation as Casey made the Lawrence
and Obergefell rationales extremely obscure.
While the Casey decision enunciated a broad conception of “liberty” inherent in
the Fourteenth Amendment, its sweeping application to a new, particularly contentious
subject such as same sex sodomy was novel. Thus, while the precedent may have been
established, it was far from uniformly recognized as legitimate. In addition, various
different (and possibly, at times, inconsistent) definitions of what constituted a natural
right had been entertained by the Court previously. Did the “fundamental right” of liberty
protected by the Due Process Clause depend on some conception of ordered liberty,
American traditions or values, or an abstract principle such as “dignity,” “autonomy,”or
“privacy?” By taking the broadest possible interpretation, the Court could reasonably
have been said to deviate from (or, at the very least, redefine) judicial norms.
Third, largely as a result of the Lawrence v. Texas decision, legislators across the
country considered preemptively amending the Constitution to include a ban on same-sex
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marriage. Indeed, President Bush supported the Federal Marriage Amendment in 2004. 269
In addition, largely as a response to the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court ruling in
2003 that legalized same-sex marriage at the state level, Bush declared in his 2004 State
of the Union address:
Activist judges, however, have begun redefining marriage by court order, without
regard for the will of the people and their elected representatives. On an issue of
such great consequence, the people's voice must be heard. If judges insist on
forcing their arbitrary will upon the people, the only alternative left to the people
would be the constitutional process. Our Nation must defend the sanctity of
marriage.270
Similar rhetoric concerning the issue would continue in the 2008 and 2012 elections.
And, when Obergefell was released in 2015, virtually every Republican candidate
denounced the decision, with Texas Senator Ted Cruz deeming it “naked and
unadulterated judicial activism.” 271 In similarly emphatic fashion, former Arkansas
Governor Mike Huckabee refused to “acquiesce to an imperial court.” 272 Surely, if any of
these candidates won the Presidency, their judicial nominations to the Supreme Court
would have included a second “litmus test” alongside that demanded by opponents of
Roe.
Finally, the degree to which justices are polarized along the legal spectrum in
these cases is abundantly clear from the dissenting opinions. It appears that when it
comes to “fundamental rights” jurisprudence, either a justice protects some intrinsic
natural liberty necessary to full realization of the human experience or, as a necessary
269
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consequence, deprives the people of their sovereign democratic right to govern
themselves.

Section Summation
Using the case studies explored in this section, it is clear that substantive due
process has played an important role in the politicization of the Supreme Court. While
Dred Scott, Lochner v. New York, and the multitude of “privacy” or “dignity” cases
analyzed have impacted rhetoric surrounding the institution in different ways, it appears
clear that the invocation of natural rights to strike down legislation is a particularly
polarizing way of interpreting the law.
It should be noted here, then, that there are two ways of understanding this thesis.
Insofar as one believes that substantive due process jurisprudence is illegitimate from a
legal standpoint and has significant polarizing effects on the Court, the doctrine should be
resolutely denounced across the board. However, if it is conceded that natural rights
jurisprudence has firm (albeit not indisputably clear) legal grounds in addition to
politicizing repercussions for the judiciary, it appears our Constitution has an inherent,
serious flaw. This analysis would imply that the Framers failed to adequately define and
balance the powers of the three branches in the manner we commonly believe they were
designed (and ought) to function. Thus, regardless of whether one finds natural rights
jurisprudence legitimate from a purely interpretative standpoint or not, the doctrine of
substantive due process creates troubling implications for our government’s system of
powers.
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Section Four: A Critical Examination of Judicial Politicization
Moving Forward
Concluding Remarks
Having explored both the constitutional merits of substantive due process or
“natural rights jurisprudence” and its politicizing effects, it is necessary now to assess
how the politicization of today’s Supreme Court should be addressed moving forward.
Unfortunately, simply prescriptions for large-scale change are often elusive. Nonetheless,
four approaches are worth careful consideration.
First, when appropriate, the Court should employ other constitutional provisions
in cases concerning an alleged “fundamental liberty” interest. For example, both
Obergefell and Lawrence could have been decided on the grounds of equal protection,
rather than substantive due process. The wide-ranging authority to adjudicate along the
lines of such a broad concept such as “dignity,” or “liberty” implies that, when the Court
does on these grounds, that the American public are somehow less moral than the justices
themselves. Such a dynamic is not healthy for the functioning of the branches, and it may
very well incentivize backlash against the bench.
And, while a larger interpretive stretch, Griswold and Lawrence could have been
decided along unreasonable search and seizure grounds, as well. The text of the Fourth
Amendment states:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated 273
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It should be duly noted that, in both of these cases, law enforcement found the
defendants in violation of the respective state statues without engaging an unreasonable
search. However, it would nonetheless have been reasonable for the Supreme Court to
take the view that this Amendment not only prohibits law enforcement officials from
intrusively investigating a potentially illegal act without a warrant or reasonable cause,
but also precludes legislatures from enacting criminal statutes that necessarily depend on
unreasonable searches to be enforced proactively. 274
Insofar as no other, suitable textual evidence can be advanced (without
intellectual distortion, of course), the Court should employ the Bill of Rights provision
that most clearly suggests the existence of enforceable unenumerated rights: the Ninth
Amendment. As explored in Section One, there is, at the very least, a comprehensible
textualist argument for natural rights in the original Bill of Rights. None exists in the
Fifth or the Fourteenth.
It might be argued that, in the end, political actors (legislators, the executive
branch, interest groups, the media, the public, etc.) do not care what the rationale is
behind the Court’s rulings. Instead, they focus exclusively on whether or not they are in
agreement with the outcome. Thus, if other constitutional provisions are used to reach a
conclusion that some sector of the population deems objectionable, another rationale will
be used to find fault with the Court’s ruling. Nonetheless, without substantive due
process, the Court will at least be forced to adjudicate controversial issues on the basis of

This interpretation may have adverse implications for searches of other “private” places in enforcing
other laws. For example, one might reasonably contend if there is no substantive difference between raiding
an individual’s sock drawer for contraceptives versus heroine. Nonetheless, this paper maintains that the
“unreasonableness” of the search is dependent on its underlying purpose, rather than simply its location.
274

114

language that is included in the constitutional text, and employing recognizable principles
of interpretation.
Second, to the extent that justices are steadfast in their belief that the Constitution
mandates Courts to adjudicate natural rights, the liberties protected under substantive due
process should remain those that are truly necessary to maintain a functioning “scheme of
ordered liberty.”275 Insofar as a compromise must be reached with regard to natural rights
jurisprudence, such a standard would limit the scope of the judiciary to decisively end
robust democratic debate on social issues rightly left for the people to decide.
Third, civic engagement and instruction must emphasize the role of the Court as
neutral arbiter. Rather than promoting the Court as the final tribunal of good versus bad,
students should be taught at an early age the founding, intended purpose of the federal
judiciary. While perhaps cliché, a return to the institution’s roots as the “bulwark of a
limited Constitution,” rather than the defender of broadly (and, often times, inadequately)
defined principles could be beneficial to tempering its currently politicized state.
Finally, the current state of the Supreme Court cannot be understood without a
firm grasp of our gridlocked political system generally. Distance between the two major
parties and the public themselves (both ideologically and geographically) is growing.
Although revitalization and expansion of the scope of substantive due process has
allowed the Court to rule on questions further outside of its legitimate adjudicative
sphere, the push for justices who reinforce the doctrine comes from the legislative arena.
Thus, the highly political nature of judicial nominations as an election issue, polarization
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among the justices themselves, and the other underlying factors contributing to the
Court’s politicization should not be viewed in a silo. Just as the Framers created a system
of government in which the legislative, executive, and judicial branches respect one
another despite their firmly different roles and perspectives, we must begin to try and
mutually understand where our fellow Americans are coming from both socially and
economically.
If nothing else, the election of President Trump demonstrated the animosity and
lack of empathy patriots of different political views have come to have for one another.
This core issue, of course, did not begin with substantive due process. Nonetheless, it
does influence the polarized nature of our general governing scheme, overall health as a
society, and sense of companionship with our fellow citizens. Unfortunately, this thesis
does not propose concrete answers to this perplexing and difficult problem, but merely
seeks to draw its attention to the politicization of the judiciary generally.
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